Research on the Development of Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry in Taiwan by Huang, Chih-Ying
Huang, Chih-Ying (2009) Research on the Development 
of Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry in Taiwan. 
[Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] 
(Unpublished) 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/22832/2/Dissertation.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
 University of Nottingham 
 
Research on the Development of 
Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry in Taiwan  
 
 
 
Huang, Chih-Ying 
 
MBA 
 
 
 
 
 
MBA      Huang, Chih-Ying      2009 
 
 
 
 
Research on the Development of 
Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Industry in Taiwan  
 
by 
 
Huang, Chih-Ying 
 
 
 
 
 
2009
Executive Summary 
After 25 year development, VC industry in Taiwan is currently during the transition 
from early stage VC focusing on financing high-tech industry to later stage PE offering 
managerial/value-added services for enterprises. However, the development of early 
stage VC and later stage PE are tremendously different in Taiwan. VC industry has 
been fully supported and strategically developed by the government policies while PE 
market is still in its infancy in terms of M&A, buyouts/ins and corporate restructuring. 
Although the government realizes the importance of domestic VC to transfer to PE, 
currently there is no complete regulation to help grow PE industry or train PE experts 
in Taiwan. In addition, the capability of local VC transferring to late stage PE is also a 
concern because most local VC funds are small-sized and lack of management 
expertise. 
 
VC has faced more and more challenges since 2004; the profitability has declined and 
the growth has been slowing in recent years. The research is going to investigate 
local and foreign VC and PE firms’ viewpoints of the challenges, and the strategies 
they are likely to adopt in order to overcome the difficulties of challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the successful model of Silicon Valley, Taiwan developed its domestic 
venture capital industry. The government in Taiwan gave fresh impetus to grow 
venture capital industry in 1982; this was regarded as the most crucial step in the 
development of venture capital. Venture capital has played an important part in the 
growth of high technology industry in Taiwan over the past 20 years. 
 
However, venture capital has faced more and more challenges in recent years, the 
growth of venture capital has been slowing down and the profitability has declined 
since 2004. It is obvious that venture capital industry in Taiwan is during the transition 
from early stage venture capital focusing on financing high technology start-up to later 
stage private equity offering managerial/value-added services for enterprises. 
Nevertheless, prior studies neither cover the wide scope of venture capital nor 
examine the rationale behind foreign venture capital firms entering Taiwan market and 
local venture capital’s capability of transferring to later stage private equity. Therefore, 
the study is going to investigate different venture capital and private equity firms’ 
viewpoints of the challenges, and the strategies they are likely to adopt during the 
transition. After the analysis, this research will propose the recommendation to the 
future development of venture capital and further researches on this topic. 
 
The empirical analysis for this research is structured into 7 sections. Section 1 is the 
introduction and motivation. Section 2 is the literature review which briefly examines 
the earlier researches on the development of venture capital in different regions and 
internationalization of venture capital. The analyses of early stage venture capital and 
later stage private equity in Taiwan are separated in section 3 and section 4 because 
there are tremendous differences between their development. Section 3 and section 4 
 2 
will adopt Wright et al.’s (2004) framework for examining the development of private 
equity in Central Europe to analyze the industry in Taiwan.  
 
Section 5 is the methodology which includes the rationale of questionnaire design, 
selecting sample set and the analysis method used in this paper. In order to include all 
the early stage venture capital and later stage private equity firms in the market of 
Taiwan, the sample data in this study is based on the information from Taiwan 
Venture Capital Association (TVCA) and “The Asian Private Equity 300”. The 2008 
Annual Industry Survey from TVCA covers list of the 183 local venture capital funds 
currently operational as the end of 2007; directory in “The Asian Private Equity 300” 
shows the foreign venture capital and private equity firms that have subsidiaries or 
representative offices in Taiwan.  
 
Section 6 is the interpretation of the statistic analysis result and the discussion of the 
current challenges in Taiwan, which could support and strengthen interpretation of the 
findings. Section 7 provides the conclusion and recommendation of further 
researches relating to VC development. In this section, there will be a conclusion of 
the analysis of industry, findings from questionnaire survey and discussions in this 
paper; and a recommendation for further research relevant to VC development in 
Taiwan. 
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2. Literature Review 
As an important type of financial intermediation, venture capital (VC) financing has 
played a crucial role in industrial development and economic growth of many 
countries. The general image of VC is the firm founded by professionals to provide 
equity, debt or managerial expertise to smaller or newly established firms which are 
considered riskier by traditional financing (Amit et al.1998). Originated from the US, 
VC has penetrated globally over the past decades (Wright et al. 2005); different from 
other service sector, there is always a particular implication behind its behavior (Barry 
1994). 
 
In ”International Venture Capital Research: From Cross-Country Comparisons to 
Crossing Borders” published in 2005, Wright et al. (2005) reviewed and synthesized 
the researches relating to international aspects of VC across some disciplines 
including economics, strategy, finance, entrepreneurship, international business and 
economic geography. They showed majority of the researches on macro-level 
comparisons of VC industries across various countries and micro-level comparisons 
of VC behavior across countries in that paper. The importance of their study is that 
relevant materials are systematically sorted into two levels and two themes. The two 
levels are the macro level relating to the development of VC industry in a country and 
the micro level is the behavior of VC firm; two themes are the internationalization 
concerning cross-country comparisons and crossing-border activities. 
 
Following Wright et al.’s paper, this section adopts a broad definition of VC to cover 
the range of finance from early stage VC to later stage private equity for management 
buy-outs and buy-ins; based on that paper, this section will select and review the 
literature on the internationalization of VC and development of VC industry in the US, 
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European and Asian countries for indentifying the regional characteristics. 
 
2.1. Why Does Venture Capital Exist 
Driven by an attempt to give a theory for describing the existence of the VC industry, 
Amit et al. (1998) used a simple formal model to prove that informational asymmetry is 
the key to explain the existence of VC industry. Before their investigation, researches 
had mainly emphasized on the importance of asymmetric information in VC markets; 
besides, some papers indicated that a major difference between traditional financial 
intermediaries (e.g. banks) and VC is that venture capitalists make investment 
decisions under the circumstances in which asymmetric information is particularly 
important. 
 
Unlike banks, VC firms provide equity financing to enterprises when it is costly for 
lenders and borrowers to reach an agreement due to asymmetric information 
problems (Jeng and Wells 2000; Wright and Robbie 1998). According to the 
investigation by Amit et al., the market failure in entrepreneurial financing is primarily 
due to moral hazard and adverse selection; and they would cause profitable projects 
to be unfunded. Venture capitalists can function as intermediary to reduce those 
possibilities of market failure but can not eliminate adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  
 
Result from the investigation by Amit et al. is well-linked to the empirical evidence in 
Canada and some European countries, and supported the idea that the more skilled 
the venture capitalists are, the more effectively they can reduce the asymmetric 
information. It is also concluded in this paper that venture capitalists are better at 
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handling the asymmetric information problems than other unprofessional investors, 
but this benefit exists most in later stage enterprises since later stage firms have a 
track record for venture capitalists. 
 
The conclusion of this paper is supported by the argument of Jeng and Wells (2000). 
They stated that the information asymmetry problems faced by venture capitalists in 
early stage are likely to be greater than those faced by M&A advisors who are 
engaging in consolidating existing companies; it also reflects the points of Robbie and 
Wright (1996) that newly established firms often have few or no fixed assets as 
collaterals to borrow loans from banks and the problems of adverse selection show up 
in later stage firms as well. 
 
In summary, the essence of VC is to purchase equity stakes in the venture and the 
success of a venture capitalist is based on realizing the increase in the value of the 
equity (John et al. 2006). It is inevitable that VC firms have to deal with many 
uncertainties in their investments (either in early stage or in late stage); unlike the 
unspecialized investors, VC‘s expertise and experiences are the essential elements 
that help reduce the asymmetric information in the process of managing investments. 
 
2.2. How Does Venture Capital work 
There are four major players in VC industry. They are entrepreneurs who lack for 
funds, investors who require higher returns, investment bankers who help VC sell 
stocks and venture capitalists who profit from making markets for the other three 
players. As shown in Figure 1, VC provides capital to finance an entrepreneurial firm; 
and then incubates the firm for a certain period of time. Finally VC will sell the stocks 
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of this firm in financial market with the help of investment banks (Zider 1998). 
 
Venture capitalists have a continuing relationship with their investees. They either 
provide capital to the entrepreneurial firms or play an active value-adding role in the 
management of their investments (Jeng and Wells 2000). In contrast to lawyers, 
accountants and consultants who provide strategies to clients, venture capitalists offer 
their services in a particular, multi-stage sequential investment process (Barry 1994). 
 
VC is a popular choice for entrepreneurs when they lack for funds (Zider 1998); 
however, evidence also shows that venture-backed management buy-outs and 
buy-ins could involve entrepreneurial activities in unpredictable environments 
(Bruining and Wright 2002). 
 
Figure 1: How the Venture Capital Industry Works 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: How Venture Capital Works (Harvard Business Review, December 1998) 
 
The upside for enterprises funded by VC is that they can also obtain managerial 
expertise from VC, but it would also cause conflicts in interests between VC and 
enterprises. Entrepreneurs may face the problems of losing control over their firms, or 
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it may be difficult for both of investee and VC to reach a consensus when they have 
different expectations for firms such marketing strategy, leverage ratios, management 
selection and so on. Overall, VC is advantageous to entrepreneurs who lack for funds 
and an essential factor for economic and industrial growth even though there may be 
some conflicts between the investee and VC. 
 
2.3. Internationalization of the US Venture Capital Firms 
VC originated in the US and spread to the UK, Western Europe and Japan (Ooghe et 
al. 1991); then penetrated into other Asian countries such as Singapore, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong while the developed markets were becoming saturated and investment 
opportunities in the developing countries were increasing (Gompers and Lerner 
1998). 
 
The US has the longest history of VC development in the world. The activity of the US 
VC expanded and grew as a professionalized practice after World War Two. Unlike 
the European and Asian traditions, a unique aspect of the US is its willingness to 
undertake risks and encouragement to entrepreneurship. This is an important element 
for the US to develop the early stage VC (Zider 1998). Silicon Valley is regarded as 
the ideal-typical VC cluster where the VC firms invest an enormous amount of capital 
in high technology start-up (Florida and Kenney 1988a). 
 
International VC developed through the globalization of the US VC firms to European 
and Asian region because new investment opportunities have increased outside the 
US (Gompers, 2005). Israel is the most successful case of VC development outside 
the US. In contrast to the US government’s contribution which is considered indirect to 
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the most important part of VC growth, Israeli government played a significant role in 
inspiring the growth of VC. There are quite few corruptions, enormous investment in 
military technology research and an outstanding education system in this country. The 
linkage between the Jewish talents in US high technology industry and Israel is also 
an important factor for the establishment of Israeli VC industry (Autler 2000). 
 
In addition to the influences of early stage VC on other countries, the US-based later 
stage private equity also has significant impacts on overseas financial markets. Dixit 
and Jayaraman (2001) studied the cases of the US private equity firms and indicated 
three models of internationalization. The specialized fund model means that funds are 
specialized by stage of investment and geographical region; the organic growth model 
refers to an integrated approach that involves the transfer of expertise from the local 
market, and the affiliate model represents a co-investment with a local domestic 
partner. 
 
VC was one of the significant driving forces to improve the ability of small and medium 
enterprises to obtain funds through initial public offerings (IPOs) in the 1980s and 
1990s. Following the US, a similar trend has emerged in Europe from the mid-1990s 
when the US venture capitalists entered the European market (John et al. 2006). 
 
2.4. Development of Venture Capital Industry in Europe 
VC market in the UK is the leading European market with the size equal to the sum of 
the rest of the European markets (EVCA, 2001). In Western Europe, the UK market 
has the strongest social culture supporting entrepreneurship while the entrepreneurial 
climate is not active in Germany. VC investment role models are available in many 
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Western European countries, but the willingness of entrepreneurs to sell the control 
over the existing companies is an important concern for VC firms (Wright 2007). 
 
Buy-outs have become an international phenomenon since highly leveraged deals 
appeared in the US listed companies in the late1970s; however, only the UK and 
Netherlands had significant activities in the 1980s in the Western Europe. France, 
Italy and Germany were slower to grow but have become more important from the 
1990s. VC markets in many Western European countries are well established and 
transactions have been increasing (Wright and Bruining 2007). As shown in Table 1, 
UK had more buy-outs and buy-ins than the US from 1997 to 2006. Figures show that 
the UK is one of the most active VC markets in the world, but the US still accounted 
for the majority of the international VC market in terms of deal value. 
 
Table 1: Numbers of buy-outs/buy-ins 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
USA 203 178 187 302 175 160 167 306 422 549 
Austria 7 5 4 13 7 18 12 14 4 7 
Belgium 10 19 16 19 25 24 20 37 28 26 
Denmark 16 13 18 18 12 18 12 14 30 20 
Finland 32 16 19 15 23 29 28 27 32 15 
France 139 150 148 131 126 124 141 159 228 155 
Germany 99 79 53 66 91 108 105 111 124 136 
Ireland 8 15 9 12 16 20 14 11 7 14 
Italy 25 32 43 31 18 38 44 43 45 49 
Netherlands 61 75 66 79 60 62 74 73 85 75 
Norway 6 4 8 7 9 12 16 13 16 19 
Portugal 3 5 6 5 1 6 5 3 5 5 
Spain 23 37 30 28 37 42 52 34 50 48 
Sweden 20 23 32 25 49 25 24 39 38 35 
Switzerland 65 51 56 54 50 36 31 35 30 23 
UK 709 690 658 623 643 639 713 706 691 617 
Source: CMBOR/Barclays private Equity/Deloitte/Thomson Financial/JBORI 
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In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), late stage private equity is an important growth 
engine of the privatization of stated-owned enterprises during the transition from 
centralized planned economies to market economies from early 1990s (Wright et al. 
2004). Wright et al. estimated that notable position of CEE to generate profits for 
private equity investors may outperform the mature markets of other EU members. 
 
2.5. Development of Venture Capital Industry in Asia 
The result of economic restructuring and decrease in attractiveness of developed 
countries to international institutional investors is the most important cause to the 
increase in VC investments in developing countries in early 1990s. Alyward (1998) 
mentioned that there has been a significant increase in new VC funds flowing to Asian 
region compared to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 1992; the total stock of 
VC funds in the two developing regions - Asia and the Central and East Europe were 
over $7 billion at the end of 1995 (Figure 2). VC markets in Asia are more advanced 
than those in CEE. Despite the less favorable equity prices in the financial markets 
from 1993, capital kept on flowing into Asia region.  
 
Figure 2: Venture Capital Stock and Flows in Asia, Central and East Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Trends in Venture Capital Financing in Developing Countries (1998) 
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Asian VC industry is structurally different from the US VC industry because of the 
institutional environments in which the firms operate. VC plays an important role in 
economic growth through accelerating technologic development and promoting 
entrepreneurship in Asia. For example, as the governments of Singapore and Taiwan 
decided to adopt innovation-driven growth strategies and restructure the economies, 
there was an urgent demand for developing domestic VC industry as the engine of 
economic growth (John 2006). 
 
Asia region has distinctive features of VC development compared with the US and 
Europe. Kenney et al. (2002a,b,c) investigated the VC development in East Asian. 
They consolidated the important factors that make Asian VC markets particular. They 
are investment opportunities, exit mechanisms, government incentives, the 
development of a technological industrial base and an encouraging entrepreneurship 
climate. Furthermore, they showed that VC industries across countries would develop 
distinctively where differences of VC firms with various goals are dominant and where 
diversified financing instruments are available. 
 
Kenney et al. (2002c) pointed out the difference in investment stage between the US 
and Asia. The US invests a larger portion of total investments in the expansion, 
mezzanine and later stage companies while Asian VC funds tend to invest in early 
stage firms and perform an essential function of providing capital to viable projects. 
The reason that the US emphasizes on later stages is relating to the fierce 
competition between enterprises that need venture capitalists to supply large number 
of capital in order to accelerate the expansion. With regard to private equity, it has not 
been strong in Asian region due to the resistance of enterprise owners to give up 
control over the existing firms. This is particularly common in and Japan and Korea 
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where the keiretsu and chaebol ties are strong in markets. 
 
National Developments 
 Japan 
Despite the earliest developed country in Asia, Japan is not the most dynamic VC 
market in this region. This might be attributable to keiretsu ties, lack of entrepreneurial 
climate and stricter criteria for IPO. While Japan’s economic growth ended in the early 
1990s, its corporations were as well facing pressure to restructure. Wright et al. (2003) 
explored the factors that facilitate the use of buyouts in Japan and how buyouts may 
contribute to the process of corporate restructuring. They concluded that buyouts are 
likely to be adapted in Japan due to the nature of corporations and the changing 
institutional environment; and the buyouts are more likely to be revitalization and 
entrepreneurial types.  
 
 Korea 
Unlike Japan with fewer VC investments in early stage firms, the traditional pattern of 
Korean VC firms has focused on investing in small companies who adapt foreign 
technology rather than in risky ventures since the first fund established in 1974. After 
the Asian Financial Crisis, Korea has experienced a dramatic increase in the number 
of independent VC firms while a decline in the number of corporate VC subsidiaries. 
The Korean VC firms concentrate their investments on information technology 
because the government policies stimulate such investments (Biggart and Guillen 
1999). In contrast to VC industry in Taiwan, Korean VC industry is relatively weak and 
is controlled by government regulations. Despite in a severe downturn, Taiwan has 
been one of the most dynamic VC markets in the world (Kenney et al. 2002c). 
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 Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has a long history as the Asian financial center. It has been functioning 
either as an exporter of capital to other areas of Asia or an importer of capital. In 1999 
to 2002, Hong Kong received more than 70% of its total VC funds from western 
countries. After Japan, it has the largest pool of VC available in Asia. A dominant 
feature of Hong Kong VC industry is that the venture capitalists come from financial 
backgrounds instead of operational background; this could explain the status of Hong 
Kong as importer and exporter of capital. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange is one of 
the oldest equity markets in Asia but the listing conditions are too strict for the start-up. 
Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) therefore established especially to bring start-up 
going public (Kenney et al. 2002c). 
 
 China 
VC emerged to be the important growth engine in the transition of centralized planned 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the 1990s (Wright et al. 2004) as 
well as in China in the 2000s. Ahlstrom et al. (2007) studied the issues on where 
China’s VC industry has been, where it is probably go in the future and the differences 
between the system in China and that of the US. They noted that the future of VC in 
China is probably to be similar to the model dominant in the US and Europe. Wright M. 
(2007), with a perspective from Europe, commented on the points raised by Ahlstrom 
et al.‘s analysis of VC in China and compared the VC development in China with that 
of Western Europe and CEE. 
 
Despite China and CEE are similar in the transition of economies, there are some 
particular differences between them. Firstly, impacts of privatization of stated-own 
companies are more important in CEE than in China and the entrepreneurial climate 
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has developed slightly stronger in CEE than in China (Wright 2007); secondly, there 
has been a growing availability of debt financing for smaller enterprises to support VC 
investment in CEE (Wright et al., 2004a, b). 
 
With regard to the similarities, both China and CEE confronted the issues of property 
rights and the enforcement; there will be many uncertainties if VC exits through IPO 
because both of their domestic equity markets lack for liquidity (Wright 2007). 
 
 Taiwan 
The government definitely plays the most important role in the creation of VC industry; 
therefore, changes of government policies could have great impacts on the VC 
development. For example, it established a favorable tax structure for VC growth and 
adopted technology-driven strategies to boost entrepreneurial climate; however, the 
government eliminated the most vital incentive for promoting VC industry in 2000, and 
that could adversely affect the fund-raising activities of domestic VC funds (Kenney et 
al. 2002a).  
 
Taiwan is one of the most active VC markets in the world and its VC industry is the 
most Silicon Valley-like in Asia. Instead of investing much in seed stage, Taiwanese 
venture capitalists prefer to focus on start-up and expansion stage enterprises. 
Kenney et al. (2002a) also emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship. They 
concluded that government is an essential role for growing VC industries in many 
countries, but it is not sufficient if the entrepreneurship is not active or there is a lack of 
attractive business sector.  
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2.6. Literature Review Summary 
There are many empirical studies on the investigation of VC industry in the world. This 
section reviews the research on the existence of VC, internationalization of VC and 
the distinctive features of VC development in different regions. 
 
By examining the studies, it can be concluded that the success of VC industry is the 
interplay of many elements such as entrepreneurial climate, advanced technologies, 
legal enforcement and availability of diverse financing instruments, but various 
economic backgrounds and social cultures would influence the growth of VC in 
different regions. Institutional features such as family control, ownership structure, or 
government policies could influence the differences between Asian and the Western 
VC firms’ investment behavior. As a matter of fact, differences on VC firms’ 
investment behavior exist not only between Asian and the Western regions but also 
emerge within Asian countries due to diverse backgrounds of government incentives, 
investment opportunities, entrepreneurship climate and exit mechanisms. 
 
Most of the successful Asian VC markets are located in East Asian countries. Of those 
countries, Taiwan is one of the most dynamic VC markets in the world, ranking beyond 
the US and Israel. Many Asian governments have expressed interests in its 
successful VC model including Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Macau, 
Mainland and China. Kenney et al. (2002) studied the VC industries of East Asia and 
contributed to a comprehensive research on VC development in this region. Important 
topics such as economic impact of VC, economic background of nations, industrial 
development and analysis, and features of VC in different countries are included and 
discussed in this paper. Nevertheless, VC in Taiwan has faced many challenges over 
the past 7 years and the overall performance has been deteriorating especially after 
 16 
the current financial crisis. Besides, Kenney et al. mainly focused on the local early 
stage VC relating to the funding of high technology ventures in this paper, the trends 
that international private equity funds have entered Taiwan market since 1999 are 
excluded from their research. Therefore, a future research would be more complete if 
the subject covers wider scope of VC and examine the rationale behind foreign VC’s 
decision to enter Taiwan market, recent buyouts/ins and the challenges facing the VC 
in Taiwan. 
 
Following Wright et al. (2004), this paper will adopt the framework they use for 
examining the development of private equity in Central Europe to analyze the growth 
of early stage VC and later stage private equity in Taiwan. The development of early 
stage VC focusing on financing high technology industry and that of later stage private 
equity providing managerial/value-added services for enterprises are tremendously 
different in Taiwan; thus, they will be analyzed separately in section 3 and section 4. 
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3. Development of Venture Capital in Taiwan 
The development of the VC industry in Taiwan is tightly linked with the growth of the 
high technology industry. The high technology industry in Taiwan has been built both 
on the steadily accumulating expertise from manufacturing industry and its strong 
connection with the international markets. In addition, local entrepreneurs were well 
linked to the US market because Taiwan’s mature manufacturing expertise has led to 
a trend in Silicon Valley to outsource the production activities. Combination of the two 
factors contributed to a background that promotes the industrial growth and venture 
investing into a healthy circle strengthening the activities of entrepreneurship and 
venture investing. Table 2 shows the stages of VC industry development in Taiwan 
from 1984 to 2005. 
Table 2: Stages of VC Industry Development in Taiwan 
Stage Period Development 
Seed Stage 1973-1984 
 1973 – Government set up the National Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI). 
 1980 – Based on the model of Silicon Valley, the National Science Council 
established the Hsinchu Science and Technology Park (HSP). 
 1982 – Government initiated a research program and evaluated the feasibility 
of developing venture capital industry in Taiwan. 
 1984 – The first venture capital firm established in Taiwan: Multiventure 
Investment Inc. 
Early Stage 1985-1994 
 1985 – The second venture fund established: Sino-Scan Venture Fund Ltd. 
 1991 – Taiwan’s venture capital made substantial investments in 
semiconductor industry 
 1992 – Taiwan Venture Capital Association (TVCA) established 
 1993 – Insurance companies were officially allowed to invest in venture capital 
industry by Ministry of Finance 
Expansion 1995-1998 
 1997 – Government announced a 5-year, NTD$ 20 billion investment target for 
venture funds in biotechnology industry 
 1998 – 38 new venture funds registered, the total funds exceeded 100 
Mezzanine 1999-present 
 2001 – The global recession led to sharp decreases in VC markets 
 2003 – Financial holding companies started to invest in VC funds 
 2005 – The market went back again 
Source: Stages of VC Industry Development in Taiwan (ITRI, 2005) 
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3.1. Demand for Venture Capital 
Taiwan’s demand for VC is mainly driven by the two factors: an emphasis on high 
technology as key industry and an encouraging entrepreneurial climate. 
3.1.1. An Emphasis on High Technology 
In the 1970s, Taiwanese government was planning to develop high technology 
industry and facilitate the transformation of traditional manufacturing enterprises into 
high value-added business. In 1973, the Taiwanese government passed the high 
technology industry regulations and set up the National Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (ITRI) as the centre for high technology research and to develop 
human resources. In 1977, Dr. K.T. Lee, the Administrator of Executive Yuan was 
delegated to investigate the growth and process of the US high technology industry. 
After making a thorough investigation of Silicon Valley in San Francisco and meeting 
with Terman (the intellectual father of Silicon Valley), Dr. K.T. Lee initiated the 
establishment of Hsinchu Science and Technology Park as the base for nurturing 
potential technology companies.  
 
Since the growth of high technology in Silicon Valley is based on the success of 
venture investing, Dr. K.T. Lee believed that the US VC model was crucial for the 
success of high technology development in Taiwan; therefore, he was actively 
introducing VC industry into Taiwan in the 1980s. 
 
In 1982, Dr. K.T Lee was the Finance Minister. The Ministry of Finance prompted the 
Executive Yuan to set up the Administrative Committee on Venture Capital 
Investment Enterprises to regulate the founding process of VC funds; the Legislative 
Yuan then followed the Executive Yuan and passed the “Venture Capital 
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Management Regulations Act” and “Venture Capital Support Act “. The completion of 
regulatory structure is viewed as the first improvement in the progress of Taiwan’s VC 
industry. The government formally established the VC industry in order to drive the 
development of domestic high technology industry in 1983. 
3.1.2. Entrepreneurial Climate 
The small and medium enterprises (SME) have dominated Taiwanese market since 
1950s (account for more than 90% of the enterprises); nonetheless, majority of the 
SME were devoting themselves to labor intensive and manufacturing industry. In the 
1970s, the SME lost their competitiveness in global market and the provisions of 
financing from local banks were getting stricter; therefore, venture investing was 
regarded as a feasible alternative of financing.  
 
At that moment, Taiwan had to not only expedite local SME to transform into high 
value-added businesses but also develop high technology industry to increase its 
competitiveness in global market. In order to learn experiences from developed 
countries, the Taiwanese government was planning to survey the achievement in the 
US technology industry. 
 
After Dr. K.T Lee’s trip to the USA and investigation into Silicon Valley, the Taiwanese 
government realized that the main success of Silicon Valley relies on human capital 
and advanced technology. At that moment, high quality of human resources, 
technology and capital were in great demand in Taiwan. The government offered 
varieties of scholarships to encourage excellent students to study abroad, notably in 
the US; then strategically provided incentives (e.g. tax benefits and subsidies) to 
attract the talents in Silicon Valley and the overseas students to start new businesses 
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in Taiwan. They were not only absorbed into high technology industry but also by high 
value-added manufacturing enterprises. Under the encouraging entrepreneurial 
climate, start-ups relating to high technology have increased dramatically since the 
1980s. 
 
3.2. Supply of Investment Opportunities 
According to the statistics from the SME Administration (the governmental department 
to formulate plans for the development of SME and relevant legislations in Taiwan), 
the number of SME was 0.75 million in 1987; with a steady growth in 20 years, the 
number was 1.244 million in 2006. Figure 3 indicates the number of SME in 2001 to 
2006. 
Figure 3: Number of SME in Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SME Administration, 2007 
 
As indicated above, SMEs’ demand for transforming in the 1970s was the initial 
source of investment opportunities for VC, but the major source are definitely the high 
technology start-ups. Compared with other developed Asian countries such as Japan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, Taiwan is smaller in terms of the available VC; however, it 
is the most active region in Asia for venture investing in terms of the number of 
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startups and the success of the venture capitalists. 
 
The venture investing cases and percentage of total investments from 1987 to 2007 
are shown in Figure 4 and 5. Followed by electronics and Optoelectric, semiconductor 
industry has the most venture-backed companies in Taiwan. Electronics and 
semiconductor are the key industries that have been strategically supported by the 
government; they experienced the extremely rapid growth from the beginning of 
1990s in Taiwan. 
Figure 4: Numbers of VC-backed Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TVCA (2007) 
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Figure 5: Percentage of VC-backed Companies by Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TVCA (2007) 
 
3.3. Infrastructure to Stimulate the Growth of Venture Capital 
A supportive government is the most important factor to drive the development of VC 
in Taiwan. In 1983, the Legislative Yuan passed the law that provided tax incentives to 
stimulate many risk takers to invest in VC firms. Individuals willing to invest in VC 
funds can enjoy an up to 20% tax deduction if they maintain their investment for at 
least two years. This tax deduction is regarded as the most important incentive to 
boost the growth of VC in Taiwan. The law initially stated that only individuals could 
receive the rebate, but in 1991 the Statute was revised to permit corporate investors 
to enjoy the 20% tax deduction. The number of VC firms dramatically increased after 
the revision.  
 
In addition to the tax deduction, there were other advantages for VC development. For 
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example, 80% of the investment income could be exempt from tax in the current fiscal 
year; this provided a one-year grace period for investors. If investors choose to 
reinvest the earnings gained from the VC investment, they were allowed to deduct the 
income from their tax return in that year. This would inspire the investors to grant the 
VC firms to reinvest its earnings. Strategically supported by the government, Taiwan 
has become one of the most successful and active VC markets in the world, ranking 
behind the US and Israel. 
 
3.4. Opportunities to Realize Gains 
When considering exit strategies, IPOs have been the preferred route for venture 
capitalists in Taiwan. Most of the VC firms realize gains through IPOs. Equity markets 
in Taiwan are well functioning and efficient; they have lowered application barriers for 
small and medium technology companies to list on the Taiwan Stock Exchange or the 
Over-The-Counter Securities Exchange. According to the Annual Industry Survey by 
Taiwan Venture Capital Association (TVCA) in 2007, VC has been the most important 
force to drive high technology start-ups to go public in capital markets in the past 20 
years. Semiconductor, electronics and telecommunication are the three primary 
industries that have the most public companies backed by VC. 
 
Besides the local capital markets, the US NSDAQ, Singapore and Hong Kong are 
also the preferred markets for IPOs. As shown in Figure 6, the USA (including Silicon 
Valley) and other Asian regions account for nearly 21% of overseas investment. 
Venture capitalists would select the markets with high price/earning ratio, liquidity and 
good reputation to realize gains. Mature capital markets such as NASDAQ, Singapore 
and Hong Kong have these advantages and consequently they are the popular 
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choices for Taiwanese venture capitalists. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of Investments by Region  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TVCA 2008 
 
Most of the entrepreneurs tend to maintain their control on their own firms; therefore, it 
is difficult for venture capitalists to obtain control of the investee and adopt the exit 
strategies such as mergers in Taiwan. Another popular exit strategy is private 
placement. VC firms’ management teams have well-established networking within 
Taiwan; they could also sell shares to other strategic buyers or wealthy individuals. 
 
3.5. Overview of the National Development Fund (NDF) 
The National Development Fund was established in 1973, with the primary objective 
to invest in the petrochemical and the semiconductor industry - the two main 
industries that the Taiwanese government was aiming to facilitate the development. 
Over the past 36 years, the NDF’s portfolio has extended to Biotechnology, 
Optoelectric, Telecommunication, Banking, Precision Machinery, Transportation 
industries. Besides those industries, it has been investing in line with the 
government’s policies in Digital Content, and Culture and Creative industry since 2005; 
both of them are regarded as the key industries in the following 5 years. Therefore, 
the NDF plays a crucial role in Taiwan’s economic growth and the development in 
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industrial sectors (Appendix 1 - Governing Regulations of the Fund). 
 
The role and position of the NDF in Taiwan are as follows. 
(1) Purpose of the Fund  
The NDF serves as one of the important tools for executing the government’s 
industrial policies. The aim of the NDF is to promote industrial upgrading and reform 
the structure of Taiwan’s industry; besides, it is also established to accelerate the 
economic development in Taiwan and to strengthen Taiwan’s competitiveness through 
governmental investing and financing. 
 
(2) Main Uses of the Fund  
The aim of NDF is to invest in or finance the major businesses and projects that 
expedite industrial upgrading or improve Taiwan’s industrial structure. It operates in 
consistent with the government’s industrial policy and, through the extension of loans, 
assists in the robust development of industries and small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
3.5.1. Operation of the NDF 
The initiative purpose of the NDF is to facilitate the growth of local enterprises which 
develop in line with the governmental policies. Nevertheless, the economic downturn 
caused by the subprime mortgage crisis has spread globally since 2007. In order to 
boost Taiwan’s economic growth, the Executive Yuan in 2007 approved the NDF’s 
participation in M&A and corporate restructuring. As a result, the function of the NDF 
extended from financing to bailout, consulter for reorganizing corporate and improving 
operation efficiency (in Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: The Operation of the NDF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Development Fund (2008) 
 
3.5.2. Requirement for the NDF Investment in Venture Capital 
The first requirement of DF investment in local VC is the lower of NT$1 billion or 30% 
of a fund size. However, it will not be subject to the regulations in investment amount 
or ratio if the Venture Capital Investment Enterprise (VCIE) meets the following 
conditions. Firstly, VCIE invest in nurturing emerging key industries, establish 
strategic alliance with a foreign company, have concrete plans for technology transfer 
or facilitate the domestic enterprises carry out reorganization or merger. 
 
Secondly, the VC are required to have at least 20% committed fund when they apply 
for the NDF investment and the fund raising should be completed within 6 months 
after receiving the approval from the NDF; one six-month period is permitted if they 
make a request for postponement.  
 
Thirdly, the domestic investment of VC should account for at least 50% of the fund's 
total investment, but there are the exceptional cases. Funds focusing on biotech 
industry investment are only required to have at least 20% domestic investment of a 
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fund's total investments. Last but not least, the total percentage of the 
government-owned shares are required to be lower than (or equal to) 49% of the VC 
firm (Appendix 2 - Application for Investment Flow Chart). 
3.5.3. Performance of the NDF Investment in Venture Capital  
In 2007, the fund size of NDF was 200 billion and it was operating without any debts. 
In order to participate in M&A, corporate restructuring, and operates in coordination 
with the government policies, the NDF was approved by the Executive Yuan to raise 
another 800 billion from local banks and postal deposits. The total fund size reached 
to 1,000 billion in October 2008. The NDF have paid back 200.5 billion to the National 
Treasury since 1973, with the net asset value amounting 201.6 billion and total value 
of the NDF is 202 billion as of today. Figure 8 shows the numbers and funds 
investment in local VC approved by the NDF. VC investment Series 1 started from 
September 1985, Series 2 started from February 1991 and Series 3 started from 
January 1998. 
 
Figure 8: Numbers and Funds Investment in Venture Capital by the NDF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Number of investment showed in ( ). 
Source: National Development Fund (2008) 
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NDF is the only official VC fund as well as the largest domestic VC fund in Taiwan. It 
has been operated in line with the important policies of government and helped 
support the industrial growth. Nevertheless, there are fewer VC funds applying for its 
investments in recent years. NDF-backed VC funds are neither allowed to invest in 
Mainland China nor in mature-stage enterprises. This has lead to a tendency that 
domestic VC funds would not take NDF as an alternative even though they have 
difficulties in fund-raising. 
 
3.6. Overview of Venture Capital Industry in Past 20 Years 
In 1984, the first local VC firm, Multiventure Investment Inc. was founded as a joint 
venture by Acer Computer Ltd. and Continental Engineering Corporation. The 
establishment of Multiventure Investment Inc. is a significant milestone in the history 
of Taiwanese VC industry. However, the founding process was disappointedly slow 
before 1995. The period of 1984 to 1995 is regarded as the development stage. From 
1996 to 1998, the number of funds dramatically increased from 34 in 1995 to 114 at 
the end of 1998; this is the expansion stage of the Taiwanese VC industry. From 1999, 
the rate of establishment of new VC funds has grown steadily and entered to the 
mature stage. 
 
Table 3 indicates the VC development from 1998 to 2007 in Taiwan. High technology 
and VC industry experienced the dramatic growth during the period of 1995 to 2000. 
VC prompts the industrial growth into a healthy circle that reinforces the activities of 
venture investing. Unfortunately, the cancellation of tax incentive in 2000 and the 
global sluggish economy from 2001 caused the number of establishment of new funds 
to decline sharply since 2001 to 2007. VC industry in Taiwan has entered to the 
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recession stage. 
Table 3: 1998κ2007 VC Development in Taiwan 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
(1) Number of VC funds 114 160 192 199 217 240 259 268 270 272 
(2) Establishment of new 
VC funds  38 46 32 7 18 23 19 9 2 2 
(3) Growth rate (of new VC 
funds) 35.71% 21.85% -30.43% -78.13% 157.14% 27.78% -17.40% -52.63% -77.78% 0.00% 
(3) Not been formally 
launchedれrelocated れ
discontinued the 
operations 
7 7 22 23 23 26 30 37 51 89 
(4) Number of operational 
VC funds 107 153 170 176 194 214 229 231 219 183 
(5) Number of fund 
management firms 59 70 74 79 86 93 101 105 105 103】  
(6) VC funds/ per 
management firm [= 
(4)/(5)] 
1.81  2.19  2.30  2.23  2.26  2.30  2.27  2.20  2.09  1.78 
Source: TVCA (November 2007) 
 
As of December 2007, 272 VC funds have been officially registered in Taiwan. Of the 
272 funds, 183 funds are currently operational, 11 funds have not been formally 
launched and 78 funds have relocated or discontinued the operations. Besides, of the 
183 existing funds, 20 funds are managing their own funds and the other 163 funds 
entrust financial consulting firms or other VC firms to manage their funds (Appendix 4 
- Venture Capital Management Firms). 
 
Figure 9 shows the changes of the capital invested from 1998 to 2006. New capital 
invested decreased dramatically from 2000 to 2001, then was gradually rising in 2002 
and 2003. In 2006, it declined to the historical lowest level from 1984. According to the 
2008 Annual Industry Report from TVCA, Taiwanese VC firms would lose their 
competiveness in global market if new capital invested continues decreasing in the 
following 3 years (Appendix 3 - Investment Amount from 1998 to 2006 and Numbers 
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of Investments from 1998 to 2006). 
 
 
Figure 9: New Funds in Year 
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Source: TVCA (2007) 
 
 
Taiwan is one of the most successful VC markets in the world. The institutional 
features cause the differences of VC firms’ investment behavior between the US and 
Taiwan. VC industry in Taiwan has several distinctive features that are worth 
investigating. 
 
(1) VC funds are organized as corporations 
The structure of business entity of VC funds in the US, Israel and India are organized 
as partnerships. Partnerships are usually advantageous for taxation purposes 
because a partnership structure does not often incur a tax on profits before they are 
distributed to the partners (in Figure 10). However, the partners would be exposed to 
Unit〈NT$ 0.1 billion 
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greater personal liabilities or obligations than they would as the shareholders of 
enterprises. 
 
Figure 10: The Ideal-Typical Organization of Venture Capital Firm in the US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Martin Kenney (2002) 
 
VC in Taiwan has been regulated to be organized in the structure of corporation since 
it was first introduced from the US in 1983 (Figure 11). The initial purpose of this 
structure is to encourage more investment in start-ups because corporations are not 
subject to the constraints that partnership should dissolve after ten-year duration. 
However, under the regulation, a VC fund has to go into liquidation before it disbands; 
in other words, operation of VC in Taiwan is not as flexible as that of the US VC that 
exists in 7 to 10 years and then distributes the remaining profits or assets before it 
dissolves. In addition, investors of VC funds are compensated through dividends but 
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not from cash or stock distributions; venture capitalists are compensated from salary 
and bonuses based on their performance. 
 
Figure 11: The Ideal Typical Organization of the Venture Capital Firm in Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Martin Kenney (2002) 
 
In recent years, the fierce competition of VC firms has resulted in the decreasing 
prestige of being a venture capitalist and generated fewer talents to dedicate to VC 
Industry in Taiwan. 
 
(2) Smaller fund size and fierce competition 
Compared with the regulations on VC in Hong Kong and Japan, the rules imposed on 
VC funds are relatively loose in Taiwan. The threshold of required capital to set up a 
VC fund is NTD$200 million as long as the fund is organized in the structure of 
corporation and approved by the Ministry of Finance. The motive of loose regulation 
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by government is to promote the growth of VC industry. However, this is also the force 
to increasing competition in VC sector in Taiwan. According the 2007 Annual Industry 
Survey of TVCA, local VC firms have been facing fierce competition due to too many 
VC having similar expertise in this industry. The increasing competition in VC industry 
has caused the decreasing rewards and prestige of being a venture capitalist in 
Taiwan. 
 
(3) The foreign VC firms in Taiwan 
The true volume of foreign VC firms operated in Taiwan is uncertain. Many foreign VC 
have entered Taiwan by investing in or entrusting their funds to local VC; that is, they 
tend to establish strategic alliance with local VC. According to 2006 Annual Industry 
Survey of TVCA, nearly 40% of local VC funds are directly invested by foreign VC. 
The structure of corporation and local VC’s networking in industry are the two 
important factors that influence foreign VC firms’ investment behavior in Taiwan. Local 
VC generates and screen deals, disposes investment and share profits with their 
“foreign partners”. 
 
As listed in “The Asian Private Equity 300”, there are 18 international VC firms setting 
up branches in Taipei. All of them are subordinate to international private equity funds. 
Compared with local VC focusing on early stages, investment of those foreign VC 
funds also covers NPL, M&A, corporate restructuring. 
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4. Development of Private Equity in Taiwan 
Private equity (PE) has been one of the most important participants in the American 
and European financial markets over the past few decades; but it was not known by 
most investors in Asia until late 1990s that the attractiveness of this area has 
increased as an investment location for global PE funds.  
 
From 1997, many Asian countries had enormous amount of distressed assets that 
needed to be restructured or disposed after the financial crisis. Take Non-Performing 
Loans (NPL) for example. A report of the Word Bank in 2001 indicated that Asian 
banks’ NPL reached to a maximum of 30% in South Korea, 35% in Malaysia, 50% in 
Thailand and 75% in Indonesia. Governments of those countries established the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC, Asian countries primarily followed the 
fundamentals of RTC in the USA though the titles may vary in different countries) and 
Asset Management Company (AMC) to help dispose those NPL. However, dealing 
with NPL is costly for a country and requires advanced financial expertise; as a result, 
the urgent demand for disposing bad assets has caused Asian region to become a 
popular location for PE funds, especially those distressed asset funds. 
 
As one of the countries suffering from financial crisis, Taiwan was also eager for 
disposing considerate NPL. This has attracted many international distressed asset 
funds to set up AMC in Taiwan from 1999 (Deutsche Bank 2001). As a matter of fact, 
global PE funds have entered Taiwan not only for distressed assets but also for new 
investment opportunities emerging from its listed companies. However, the 
government’s perspective, global PE funds are constructive to assist in dealing with 
non-performing assets but hostile to take over the listed companies in equity market. 
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4.1. Demand for Private Equity 
In contrast to the dynamic early stage VC and venture investing, Taiwan’s PE market 
saw relatively low activities. According to enterprise statistics from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MOF), there is only one domestic PE fund officially registered in 
Taiwan. Huiyang Private Equity Fund Co., Ltd was established in May 2005 by Mr. 
Yangtze Chiang (the ex-minister of Ministry of Finance). The fund size amounted to 
NTD$ 1.95 billion as of the end of 2006. The fund initially focuses on management 
buyouts of local SME and would extend to start-up financing after its second-round 
fundraising (MOF 2008). 
 
The dramatic growth of distressed assets after the Asian financial crisis creates 
demand for advanced financial expertise. Therefore, Taiwan’s demand for PE is 
mainly driven by urgency to dispose NPL and corporate restructuring. 
4.1.1. Disposal of Non-Performing Loans 
According to a survey from Taiwan Institute of Economic Research in 2002, the 
amount of NPL reached to the level of NTD$2,100 billion as of the end of 2001. NPL 
would not only threaten the economic growth but also diminish Taiwan’s 
competitiveness if they are not disposed properly and rapidly. As mentioned above, 
disposing bad assets is costly for a national government and requires advanced 
financial expertise; the Executive Yuan consequently passed the enactment in 2001 
to encourage foreign distressed asset funds to establish joint ventures with local 
banks or set up AMC in Taiwan.  
 
Taiwan has become the most active NPL market in Asia (except Japan) since early 
2002. There were more than 50 NPL transactions between local banks and AMC from 
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2002 to the end of 2004, with the amount of NTD$58.7 billion or 25% of the total book 
value of NPL (NTD$235 billion). Of those NPL purchased by AMC, NTD$181.4 billion 
was purchased by foreign AMC (in Table 4); this accounted for 77% of the NPL 
market. Besides, majority of those foreign AMC are from the USA. Of the foreign AMC, 
Lone Star purchased the largest amount of NPL from domestic financial institutions, 
with the amount of 82.2 billion as of 2004 (Ernst & Young 2004). 
 
Table 4: NPL bought by foreign AMC form 2002 to 2004 
Name of AMC Country】 Total amount of NPL (NTD$ billion) Sources of Non-Performing Loans 
Lone Star USA 82.2 
First BankれCosmos BankれChang Hwa 
BankれKaohsiung business bank 
Cerberus  USA 20 First BankれWan Tung Bank 
GE Capital  USA 16 First Bank 
Colony Investors V, L.P. USA 15.8 Taiwan Business Bank 
Lehman Brothers USA 15.6 
First BankれFubon BankれTaiwan 
Business Bank 
Shinsei Bank Japan 13.3 Hua nan bank 
Deutsche Bank Germany 5.3 Chiao Tung Bank 
Merrill Lynch USA 4.7 China Bills Finance Corporation 
Morgan Stanley USA 4.5 TC Bank 
Salomon Smith Barney USA 4.0  Chiao Tung Bank 
Total 181.4 
Note: Although foreign AMC such as GM Holdings, GMAC, and Orix Corporation also 
participated in NPL market, the total book value of NPL they purchased are relatively minor so 
they are excluded from the list. 
Source: Citigroup (2005) 
 
Domestic banks have reduced the overall NPL ratio from 11.27% in 2001 to 1.54% as 
of July in 2008 (see Figure 12) because of the sizable disposal of NPL (see Figure 13). 
Accordingly, Taiwan’s NPL market saw relatively low activity in 2007 and 2008. It 
seems that overall NPL ratio in Taiwan has been under control from 2006; in addition, 
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more and more local AMC have established and participated in public auctions of NPL 
market over the past 4 years. Therefore, it can be concluded that Taiwan’s demand 
for foreign AMC/distressed asset funds is expecting to decrease in the following years 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers 2008). 
 
Figure 12: Total Loans with NPL Ratios from 2001 to July of 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banking Bureau, Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan) 
 
Figure 13: Total NPL Sales through Public Auction from 2001 to July of 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banking Bureau, Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan) 
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4.1.2. Corporate Restructuring 
After the Asian financial crisis, a sluggish economy in Taiwan caused some group 
enterprises to be in financial difficulties. There were 19 enterprise groups falling into 
financial distress from October 1998 to June 1999; most of them were engaged in 
diversification, reciprocal shareholding and speculations in stock markets. At that 
moment, more than 10 of the 19 enterprises applied for corporate restructuring from 
court in order to adjust capital structure and lower the interest expenses.  
 
Those enterprises applying for corporate restructuring nearly went bankrupt due to 
maladministration and management team’s speculation in stock markets; however, 
the technology or know-how possessed by them were still advanced in the industries. 
It would require substantial capital and professional management expertise to help 
those enterprises revitalize.  
 
As of today, the only successful case of corporate restructuring in Taiwan is Tong Lung 
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. The company was purchased by HSBC Private Equity (Asia) 
after it obtained the approval for restructuring from court in 2001. After five-year 
operation by HSBC PE, Tong Lung listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange again in 
2006. The case is described as follows. 
 
Established in 1954, Tong Lung was once the largest company manufacturing and 
selling door locksets, with total assets amounting to NTD$7.9 billions in 1996. It was 
operated very well until 1998 that the new management teams (the second generation 
of the founder) got deeply involved in speculations in stock markets and caused great 
losses of company. In 1999, Tong Lung’s total assets were less than NTD$1 billion but 
with liabilities more than NTD$6.2 billion. As one of the crediting banks of Tong Lung, 
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HSBC Bank owned 5% (NTD$0.3 billion) of the total creditors’ rights (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14: Creditors’ rights of Tong Lung 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Deloitte Research Report (2007) 
 
Though HSBC Bank accounted for a minor portion of the total creditor’s rights, HSBC 
Private Equity (Asia) decided to invest in Tong Lung after a thorough evaluation by the 
Managing Director, Bo-Chang Chen. Mr. Chen found that Tong Lung’s manufacturing 
technology was more advanced than competitors in lockset industry of Asian and 
American. Since it was undervalued and needed to be restructured, HSBC invested 
NTD$2.2 billion in Tong Lung and owned 72% of its shares in October 2001. Mr. Chen 
became the General Manager of Tong Lung and formed a new management team. 
After five-year operation by HSBC PE, Tong Lung listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange in March 2006. In October 2006, TEST RITE Group (an international 
consumer retailing group) purchased 68% (NTD$2.178 billion) of Tong Lung’s total 
shares through six holding companies registered in Cayman Island (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Transaction of Tong Lung 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Deloitte Research Report (2007) 
 
This case not only represents a success in corporate restructuring but also marks an 
important event in Taiwan because it is the first distressed company to be revitalized 
by a global PE firm. 
 
4.2. Supply of Deal Opportunities 
Despite substantial NPL sales, PE market in Taiwan is still in its infancy in terms of 
M&A, buyouts/ins and corporate restructuring. In contrast to other East Asian 
countries, Taiwan is not as attractive as Japan and Korea to global leading PE funds. 
There are several factors that make Taiwan a less appealing location to those 
international PE funds.  
 
As noted above, SME accounts for more than 90% of the enterprises in Taiwan’s 
market; this dominant feature combined with active venture investing has prompted 
the economic growth in Taiwan. However, nearly half of SME in Taiwan are 
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family-owned companies and the owners are generally unwilling to sell the control 
over the companies when they need to raise more funds from foreign investors. This 
is a common institutional feature in Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Besides the above 
features, many entrepreneurs and investors are under the impression that PE funds 
would strip valuable assets from investee; regulations relating to investments in local 
companies are not favorable for foreign PE funds if they invest in Taiwan-based 
companies. As a result of these factors, global PE funds in Taiwan are not as active as 
they are in Japan, Korea or Hong Kong (Appendix 5 - Top 20 Private Equity Trade 
Sale Exits in 2007 Asia). 
 
Despite relatively lower activities than Japan and Korea, PE market in Taiwan has 
grown rapidly in the past few years compared with that before 2006. The first buy-out 
deal by foreign PE was emerging in 1999. Carlyle Asia (Hong Kong) purchased three 
domestic cable TV corporations by $90 million; then it consolidated the three 
companies to form Taiwan Broadband Communications Ltd, (TBC). In 2005, Carlyle 
Asia sold TBC to Macquarie Bank (Australia) and Macquarie Infrastructure Group 
(Australia) at $883.4 million.  
 
Table 5 shows the remarkable transactions in Taiwan from 1999 to 2007. It is quite 
obvious that PE market has grown quickly after 2005. Investees primarily include 
banking, manufacturing, media and semiconductor sectors. The rationale behind the 
transactions varies in each sector. Taiwanese banks have been suffering from 
decreasing competitiveness and lack of internationalization, especially those large 
financial groups. Introduce capital from global PE would help enhance the managerial 
efficiency, reinforce the capital structure and increase their global reach; therefore, 
investments by foreign PE are welcome in banking sector. For semiconductor and 
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manufacturing sectors, the three transactions in Table 5 are management buyouts. 
The founding families of Nien Made, ASE Group and Fu Sheng attempted to privatize 
the companies with the capital from global PE. However, Nien Made is the only 
successful deal of the three. ASE Group did not reach an agreement with Carlyle Asia 
on share price and future development of company. Fu Sheng was successfully 
privatized in early 2008, but the founding family was prosecuted for insider trading in 
this transaction.  
 
With regard to media sector, global PE was attracted by the companies’ stable cash 
flow and solid market share. TBC is the also the first successful trade sale exit of 
foreign PE in Taiwan market. 
Table 5: Global Private Equity Investments in Taiwan  
Year Investor  Investee Sector of  Investee Amount 
Deal 
Stake 
Financing 
Stage 
2007 Longreach Group EnTie Commercial Bank Banking $700 million 51% 
PIPE 
financing 
2007 Carlyle Asia & Corsair Capital Ta Chong Bank Banking $655 million 37% 
PIPE 
financing 
2007  SAC Private Capital Cosmos Bank Banking  $647 million 70% Buy-outs 
2007 CVC Asia Pacific  Nien Made Enterprise Co. 
Manufacturing 
(Furniture)  $750 million 100% Buy-outs 
*2007 Oak Tree Capital Fu Sheng Industrial Co 
Manufacturing (Golf 
Club Head )  $940 million 100% Buy-outs 
*2006 Carlyle Asia  ASE Group Semiconductor  $5,970 million  79% Buy-outs 
2006 Carlyle Asia  Eastern Multimedia Media  $1,300 million  100% Buy-outs 
2006 Newbridge Capital Taishin Financial Holding Banking  $840 million  24.30% 
PIPE 
financing 
2006 Temasek Holdings E. SUN Financial Holdings Banking  $400 million  15.00% 
PIPE 
financing 
1999 Carlyle Asia (Hong Kong) 
Taiwan Broadband 
Communications Media  $90 million  100% Buy-outs 
Note: *marks the unsuccessful transactions. 
Source: AVCJ (2009) 
 
 43 
4.3. Infrastructure to Complete Deals 
4.3.1. Legal Infrastructure and Enforcement 
In order to accelerate banks’ disposal of NPL in Taiwan, the Executive Yuan passed 
the enactment of “Financial Institutions Merger Law” to regulate the procedure of NPL 
transactions and provide incentives to facilitate the establishment of AMC. The 
Ministry of Finance reduced the Gross Business Revenue Tax for banks from 5% to 
2% in February 1999; banks were therefore required to use tax savings to write off 
bad loans. Besides, losses from selling NPL by a bank to AMC could be amortized 
over five years and tax rate of 2% for banks could apply to AMC for the disposal of 
NPL from local financial institutions. 
 
In a cross-department session held by Executive Tuan in 2001, President Shui-Bian 
Chen set the “2-5-8 Target“ that banks should reduce the ratio of NPL to below 5% 
and increase the capital adequacy ratio to above 8% within 2 years. This was 
regarded as the most influential enforcement to accelerate the disposal of NPL in 
Taiwan. 
 
In addition to law and enforcement, Ministry of Finance issued the first draft of 
Financial Asset Securitization Law (FASL) in late 2001. The regulation did not pass 
because of the political wrangles between the Legislative Yuan and the executive 
department. After cross-department negotiations for several months, the regulation 
passed in June 2002 (structure of securitization is shown in Figure 16). FASL covered 
the principles and structures of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), transfer of financial 
assets to SPV, issuance of securities. At the moment, the legal framework for 
securitization was well established in Taiwan. 
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Figure 16: Structure of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banking Bureau, Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan) 
 
 
4.3.2. Development of Professional Services 
In the 1970s, Taiwan experienced rapid economic growth and earned the reputation of 
“one of the four East Asian Tigers”. Enterprises were expanding their businesses 
either domestically or globally while Taiwanese government was stimulating economic 
growth through varieties of industrial policies. The economic prosperity has attracted 
many international companies to set up branches or subsidiaries in Taiwan. 
 
With the well-known accounting firms, law firms, investment banks and real estate 
professionals coming from western countries, local business practice has made a 
transition towards western norms. The pool of resources combined with those firms’ 
global reach provides professional services to global PE funds when they entered 
 45 
Taiwanese market. Those service firms could facilitate local enterprises and global PE 
to reach an agreement more effectively and ensure both buyers and sellers to benefit 
from completing deals. 
 
Table 6 shows the services provided in NPL transactions, buyouts/ins and M&A deals 
in recent years. Services of the accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst &Young, PwC and 
KPMG) range from financial advice, legal to management consulting while other 
companies mainly focus on one or two professional services.  
 
Table 6: Professional Services 
Services 
 
Firms】
Financial Advice 
Mezzanine 
Financing/ 
Bridge 
Financing 
Legal 
Consulting 
Management 
Consulting 
Real Estate 
Appraisal 
Mckinsey V   V  
BCG      
Deloitte V  V V  
Ernst &Young V  V V  
PwC V  V V  
KPMG V  V V  
Baker & McKenzie   V   
Jones Day   V   
JP Morgan V V    
Morgan Stanley V V    
Credit Suisse V V    
Goldman Sachs V V    
Jones Lang LaSalle     V 
CB Richard Ellis     V 
DTZ     V 
Source: Sorted by the research 
 
 
 
 46 
4.3.3. Senior Debt, Mezzanine Financing and Bridge Financing 
The availability of financing instruments is an important condition for PE to complete 
deals because they often use debt to finance a large proportion of transactions. In 
Taiwan, the banking sector is fiercely competitive due to “overbanking” – too many 
banks compete in the same market. Most of the local banks have been suffering from 
the exceed deposit for several years. As a result, the competition from overbanking 
increases local banks’ willingness to provide senior debt to finance PE transactions.  
 
In addition to senior debt, there are mezzanine financing and bridge financing offered 
by international investment banks in Taiwan including Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
Nomura Securities Co., Ltd. and so on. As a matter of fact, those global banks not 
only provide varieties of financial instruments for PE to complete deals but also 
manage their own PE funds to invest in Asian region. 
 
4.4. Opportunities to Realize Gains 
Of the NPL purchased by foreign AMC, majority of them are secured loans 
(enterprises) and housing mortgages (individuals). There are two common ways for 
the foreign AMC to realize gains. The first way is asset securitization. They would 
initially evaluate and select the loans or assets that could generate cash flow; then 
aggregate those loans and assets in a pool to issue new securities. AMC could 
generate cash in advance and diversify risks in the financial market. The second way 
is to sell the properties that insolvent companies used to secure for their loans after 
they are reconstructed by AMC. 
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For the buyouts and corporate restructuring, Carlyle Asia exited by selling TBC to 
Macquarie Bank (Australia) and Macquarie Infrastructure Group (Australia); Tong 
Lung listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (IPO). 
 
4.5. Issues of PE Development in Taiwan 
Through the analysis of PE development, it is clear that the role of later stage PE has 
become more important in Taiwanese market. High-tech industry is mature and 
provides fewer investment opportunities for early stage VC; more and more listed 
companies need enormous capital from global PE to privatize so that they will not be 
constrained by the regulations limiting the investment in Mainland China.  
 
Compared with the growth of VC industry, the development of PE has not been fully 
supported by the government. The governmental officials worry about foreign PE’s 
source of capital, beneficiary of transactions, and corporate governance issues. As a 
matter of fact, the causes to the failure of ASE Group and Carlyle Asia are not only the 
disagreement on share price and future development but also the strict supervision by 
government.  
 
The government realizes that it is necessary for local VC to transfer to PE; however, 
currently there is no complete regulation favorable to PE or help grow PE in Taiwan. 
Besides, the capability of local VC transferring to late stage PE is also an important 
issue because most local VC funds are small-sized and lack of management 
expertise. 
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5. Methodology 
TVCA has been publishing the Annual Industry Survey every year since it established 
in 1992. Though it might be the most comprehensive study of VC industry in Taiwan, 
the survey only covers the development of local VC funds. In addition, by reviewing 
the relevant literature and tracing the VC development in this paper, it can be seen 
that VC in Taiwan is currently during the transition from early stage VC focusing on 
financing high technology industry to later stage PE offering managerial/value-added 
services for enterprises. However, the unfavorable attitude of the government toward 
foreign PE would be the main obstacle to the success of transition. Besides, the 
influences of Mainland China should not be underestimated. The economic growth of 
China has generated capital and VC experts flowing from Taiwan. This is also a 
challenge facing the government and VC industry in Taiwan.  
 
After a review on literature, industry survey and the current situation of VC industry, 
we can find that there is no research comprehending all the participants from the early 
stage VC to later stage PE in Taiwanese market, the main challenges facing the 
industry, and the strategies that they are likely to adopt during the transition. The 
opinions of various VC/PE firms might differ on those issues. Therefore, the survey of 
this paper is going to bridge the gap in the literature on VC development in Taiwan 
and Annual Industry Survey of TVCA.  
 
As mentioned in Literature Review, economic backgrounds, social cultures and 
government policies would affect VC firms’ investment behavior. The survey is to 
emphasize and inquire different VC and PE firms’ viewpoints of the challenges, and 
the strategies they are likely to adopt for confronting those challenges. 
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5.1. Methodological Approach 
Holme & Solvang (1997) explained two different methodological approaches used in 
the study of social science filed: the quantitative and the qualitative approach. The two 
approaches are usually combined by the researchers in a study or project because 
they are not exclusive and there are no absolute contrasts between the two 
approaches. 
 
The data collected in a research can be turned into numbers by using a quantitative 
approach. Researchers will use tools (e.g. questionnaire) to collect numerical data 
and this makes it possible for them to analyze the data statistically. The aim of this 
approach is to group features into different types and use statistical models to 
explain the findings. Qualitative approaches focus on the researchers’ 
comprehension and interpretation of the data which is organized in the form of 
words, objects or pictures; the data can not be turned into numbers. The aim of 
qualitative approach is to offer a complete description of what is perceived by the 
researches (Holme & Solvang 1997). 
 
The advantage of quantitative method is that all aspects of the research are carefully 
designed before the data is collected. In order to investigate Taiwanese VC industry 
from a wider perspective and analyze the information in a statistical model, this 
paper will adopt quantitative approach and use questionnaire to collect the 
viewpoints from the VC and PE funds that have invested or conducted transactions 
in Taiwan. 
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5.2. Questionnaire Design 
The survey focuses on the challenges and strategies to design the questionnaire. 
Questions are categorized into 3 parts in this questionnaire: Profile of participant 
VC/PE firm, Challenges to Taiwan VC and PE industry, and Strategies of Taiwan VC 
Industry.  
 
Profile of participant VC and PE firm 
The first part of this questionnaire is to gather the background information of each 
participant VC/PE fund. The 5 questions about background are (1)types of funds, 
(2)major expertise, (3)main source of capital, (4)preferred investment field and 
(5)investment stages. 
 
Challenges to Taiwan VC and PE industry 
The second part is the challenges facing VC industry in Taiwan. Based on the 
framework used in 2008 Annual Industry Survey of TVCA, challenges are generalized 
into four main broad areas.  
 
(1) Lack of variety of funding sources 
Government regulations limit the investment of banks, insurance, securities firms, 
government pension funds and postal deposits in VC firms. Pension fund in Taiwan is 
not allowed to invest in local VC firms while it is one of the major funding sources of 
VC in the US and Europe. Corporate Investors and investment companies are the two 
main funding sources of VC firms in Taiwan. In addition to the limitation on funding 
sources, cancellation of tax incentive and sluggish economy might have stronger 
adverse impacts on fundraising activities of VC firms. Investors would rather invest 
money in equity market than provide capital to VC firms. 
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(2) Scarcity of investment opportunities 
Entrepreneurial climate is an important factor to grow VC industry because it creates 
the investment opportunities for VC firms. However, entrepreneurs in Taiwan have 
been decreasing as high technology industries are highly developed and mature. 
Besides, the regulation that limits the VC investment in Mainland China is also an 
important cause to the scarcity of investment opportunities. In the past decade, the 
emergence of corporate-based VC firms has increased the competition in VC industry 
and eliminated the investment opportunities for independent VC firms. 
 
(3) Human capital 
As the competition increases between VC firms, there are fewer and fewer talents 
who want to dedicate to VC industry due to the decreasing rewards and prestige of 
being a venture capitalist. In addition, lack of economic prosperity in Taiwan causes 
domestic VC experts to flow to Mainland China in recent years. 
 
(4) Exit mechanism 
IPOs have been the preferred route for Taiwanese VC firms to realize gains. However, 
due to sluggish economy, the price/earning ratio in domestic financial markets have 
been relatively lower than that in Hong Kong and Singapore equity markets from 
2005.  
 
Strategies of Taiwan Venture Capital Industry 
In order to realize how the VC/PE firms react to the existing challenges, the third part 
of this questionnaire is to investigate what strategies they are likely to adopt in the 
following 3 years.  
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 Piloting 
As a matter of fact, there are many factors behind each area of challenge. In order to 
indentify the factors that might have more influential effects in the 4 different areas, a 
piloting is necessary before this questionnaire is formally issued. Piloting tests can 
help identify logistical problems, assess whether the question is realistic, and collect 
preliminary data from the participants. Before conducting survey, the questionnaire is 
issued to TVCA and 4 local VC funds for piloting test. Feedbacks from piloting provide 
very helpful opinions for the modification of this questionnaire.  
 
5.3. Sample Set 
According to the 2008 Annual Industry Survey from TVCA, there are 183 VC funds 
currently operated in Taiwan as the end of 2007, including Huiyang Private Equity 
Fund Co., Ltd. However, all the 183 funds are local VC funds no matter what types of 
funds they are (independent funds or corporate-based VC funds). 
 
Besides the statistics surveyed by TVCA, the research also uses “The Asian Private 
Equity 300” as reference material to select the foreign VC and PE firms that have 
subsidiaries or representative offices in Taiwan. Therefore, the total sample set in 
this survey covers the local and foreign firms, that is, from the early stage VC to later 
stage PE in the market of Taiwan. Based on the two publications, there are 202 
copies of questionnaire issued to the VC and PE firms that have invested or 
conducted transactions in Taiwan. 
 
5.4. Analysis Method 
In order to achieve the research objective and get a further understanding of the 
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insight on “challenges facing VC and PE firms (VC and PE firms’ viewpoints to the 
challenges)“ and “the strategies (behavior) they are likely to adopt“, a one-way 
independent ANOVA is employed in this research. The method is used in the 
situations where researchers want to compare several means after collecting their 
data using different participants in each condition.  
 
In the research, potential differences between foreign and local VC/PE firms operating 
in Taiwan regarding to the challenges in 4 broad areas are analyzed by using ANOVA. 
ANOVA analysis can be used to examine both within group and between group 
differences between foreign and local VC/PE firms. 
 
The ANOVA model assumes that (1)each sample is normally distributed, (2)variances 
in each group are equal, (3)subjects are randomly selected from the population, 
(4)scores are statistically independent; in other words, they have no concomitant 
relationship with any other variable or score. The one-way independent ANOVA 
compares several means when those means come from the different groups of 
participants. 
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6. Interpretation and Discussion 
6.1. Profile of Participant VC and PE Firms 
Type of Company 
Besides the statistics from TVCA and the list in “The Asian Private Equity 300”, there 
are 202 copies of questionnaire issued to the local and foreign funds currently 
operational Taiwan. Of the 202 funds, there are 61 funds responding to the survey. 
Of the 61 funds, there are 49 General Purpose VC funds; 8 Specialty VC funds and 
4 PE funds (Figure 17); 55 participants are from local funds and the remaining 6 
participants are from foreign funds. All of the 49 General Purpose VC funds are local 
funds while 4 funds of the Specialty VC funds and 3 funds of the PE funds are 
foreign funds.  
 
General Purpose VC fund accounts for nearly 80% of all the participants in the survey; 
this consists with the survey of TVCA (2008) that more than 70% of the local VC funds 
are general purpose funds. Of the 49 funds, 12 funds are corporate-based VC funds; 
9 of the 12 funds are high-tech company-based VC funds. 
 
Figure 17: Type of Funds 
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Major Expertise 
Figure 18 presents the major expertise of the 61 participant funds. From the finding, it 
is clear that majority of the local funds possess “financial expertise” and 
“industry/technology know-how” as their major expertise. There are only 4 local funds 
that possess “fundraising” as the major expertise; this could reflect the facts that local 
VC firms are facing fierce competition due to too many competitors have similar 
expertise. The only local fund having “management skills/value-added expertise” is 
Huiyang Private Equity Fund Co., Ltd. 
 
The result also shows that major expertise of local and foreign funds are quite 
different. Of the 6 foreign funds, the major expertise includes “networking in industry”, 
“management skills/value-added” and “fundraising”. No foreign funds have “financial 
expertise” or “industry/technology know-how” as their major expertise in the survey. 
 
Figure 18: Major Expertise 
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Major Source of Funds 
Figure 19 indicates that corporate investors and investment companies are the major 
sources of capital of local VC funds; the third largest source is parent company. As 
mentioned above, there are 12 corporate-based VC funds in the survey; therefore, it 
goes without saying that all of the 12 funds are primarily financed by their parent 
companies. Of the 6 foreign funds in the survey, 2 funds are mainly financed by 
pension funds while the other 4 funds receive capital from banks, corporate investors 
and financial holding companies. Of the 61 funds, there are 10 local funds financed by 
high-net-worth individuals; this might be inconsistent with the current situation that 
there are fewer and fewer individuals willing to invest in VC due to the cancellation of 
tax incentives. 
 
Figure 19: Major Source of Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Investment Field 
From the result, it is clear that semiconductor, IT and electronic sectors are the main 
investment fields of the 61 respondents (Figure 20). It is in with the industrial 
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development in Taiwan that semiconductor (including IC design sector) and electronic 
industries have the most VC-backed companies over the past 20 years. The only fund 
focusing on venture capital is a foreign VC fund. As noted earlier, many foreign VC 
entered the Taiwanese market by establishing strategic alliance with local VC funds 
instead of setting up branches. Another fund targeting traditional manufacturing is a 
local VC fund. This might imply a tendency in Taiwan that VC has been investing in 
high value-added enterprises of manufacturing industry. 
 
Figure 20: Major Investment Field 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Investment Stage 
Of the 61 participants, 9 funds target start-up stage enterprises, 39 funds mainly 
invest in expansion stage enterprises, 12 funds focus on mezzanine stage and 1 fund 
aims at buyout/M&A (Figure 21). Only 7 local funds focus on investing in start-up 
enterprises. The only fund focusing on buyout/M&A is Huiyang Private Equity Fund 
Co., Ltd; it is aiming at management buyouts of SME in domestic market. The result 
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shows that local VC funds tend to invest in later stage enterprises. This reflects the 
current situation in Taiwanese VC industry that many VC funds have become 
risk-adverse investors because they have been tending to finance expansion stage 
enterprises instead of providing capital to start-up enterprises. 
 
Figure 21: Major Investment Stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Summary  
After an initial examination on the profile data, several notable features are found in 
the result. All of the 49 General Purpose VC funds are local funds; majority of local 
funds possess “financial expertise” and “industry/technology know-how” as major 
expertise. The preferred investment stages of local VC funds are expansion stage. Of 
the 6 foreign funds, 3 funds are PE funds and the other 3 funds are Specialty funds; 
with regard to the major expertise, 3 funds are good at “fundraising”, 2 funds have 
“networking in industry” as the major expertise and 1 fund possesses “management 
skills/value-added” expertise. There are 2 foreign funds focusing on Startup stage. 
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6.2. Interpretation of Analysis 
From the initial examination in section 6.1, two important trends are shown in the 
result. Firstly, all of the 49 General Purpose VC funds are local funds; of the 6 foreign 
funds, 3 funds are PE funds and the other 3 funds are Specialty funds. Secondly, 
different types of funds possess different expertise, which might affect their preferred 
investment stage. Therefore, based on the initial findings, the research will further 
investigate the “main challenges facing different types of funds” and “the strategies 
they are likely to adopt”.  
 
It is assumed that different institutions (types of funds) will have different viewpoints of 
the challenges in the 4 broad areas and adopt different strategies. “Homogeneity of 
Variances” and Levene’s test are used in this paper to examine whether the 
assumption is tenable or not.  
 
The assumption “Homogeneity of Variances” means that the variances should be the 
same through the data. In designs in which researchers set several groups of 
participants; this assumption means that each of these samples comes from 
populations with the same variance. In correlational designs, this assumption means 
that the variance of one variable should be stable at all levels of each other variance. 
Levene’s test tests the hypothesis that the variances in the groups are equal (the 
difference between the variance is zero). Therefore, if Levene’s test is significant at 
PΨ0.05, then it can be concluded that the null hypothesis is incorrect and the 
variances are significant. Thus, the assumption of homogeneity of variances has been 
violated. However, if Levene’s test is significant at PΩ0.05, then the null hypothesis 
that the difference between the variances is zero. The variance is roughly equal and 
the assumption is tenable. 
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After the assumption is examined, there is a test on the difference between groups. If 
the test is significant at PΨ0.05, then there is a significant difference between groups; 
it the test is significant at PΩ0.05, then there is no significant difference between 
groups. 
 
Funding issues 
Table 7 shows that there is a significant difference in funding issues between General 
VC fund, Specialty VC fund and PE fund; Figure 22 indicates the means of the three 
groups. From the results, it is obvious that different institutions (types of funds) have 
different viewpoints of funding issues. 
 
Table 7: Homogeneity of Variances and Levene’s test - Funding Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square Sig. 
Between Groups 1.134 2 0.657 0.000 
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Figure 22: Mean Plots - Funding Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan developed its own VC industry by following the successful model of Silicon 
Valley, so it is not surprising that Taiwanese VC is the most Silicon Valley-like in Asia. 
However, institutional features could influence the varieties in the VC growth across 
various countries. It is clear that the motive to develop VC industry, the economic 
backgrounds, and the social culture in Taiwan are quite different from those in the US 
and Europe. Unlike the US government, the Taiwanese and Israeli governments are 
regarded as the most important role to the success of VC industry (Autler 2000); in 
other words, the changes in government policies could have great impacts on the VC 
activities.  
 
In Figure7, it can be seen that the means of General VC fund are 1.75, while those of 
Specialty fund are 1.91 and PE fund are 2.33. Of the 6 factors in the area of funding 
issues, three factors are especially viewed by General VC fund and Specialty VC fund 
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as “very difficult” and “quite difficult”. They are factor 1 - regulations limiting the 
participation of postal deposits and government pension funds in investment in VC/PE 
funds, factor 2 - cancellation of tax credit incentive enjoyed by shareholders of VC 
funds, and factor 4 - lack of international reputation (difficulties in fund-raising from 
international institutions. However, factor 1 and factor 2 are viewed by the 3 foreign 
PE funds as “neutral” (Appendix 6 – Questionnaire); all of the 3 foreign PE funds view 
factor 6 - the economic growth of Mainland China generates capital flowing from 
Taiwan as “very difficult”. 
 
The result proves that the cancellation of the most important incentives for promoting 
VC industry has adversely affected the fund-raising activities of domestic VC funds. 
The limitations or regulations relating to fundraising do not affect foreign PE funds 
because their sources of capital are not subject to the supervision of government in 
Taiwan. For the foreign PE funds, they concern more about the growth of China and 
the impacts on capital flowing from Taiwan to China. 
 
In addition, most of the local VC funds small in terms of fund size and lack for 
international reputation; therefore, it is very difficult for them to raise funds from 
international institutions, especially for those independent VC. For corporate-based 
VC, they could be mainly financed by its parent companies. Though the 
corporate-based VC can receive capital from parent companies, from the result in this 
survey, it is obvious that fundraising is the most difficult challenge in the 4 broad areas. 
Table 8 indicates the sources of capital in 2007. Corporate investors and investment 
companies account for 55.17% of the funding source of local VC, followed by 
insurance companies which reach to the level of 10.94%. Pension funds account for 
0% because they are currently not allowed to invest in VC. 
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Although the issues on source of capital are not specially mentioned in Literature 
Review, its importance should not be underestimated. Ahlstrom et al. (2007) noted 
that the prohibition against pension funds investment in VC is an important issue in all 
Asian VC industry.  
 
Table 8: Sources of Capital in 2007 
Source of Capital 
Government 5.33% 
Banks 7.17% 
Financial Holding Companies 8.12% 
Insurance Companies 10.94% 
Corporate Investors 36.44% 
Investment Companies 18.73% 
Pension Funds 0.00% 
Securities Firms 3.56% 
Private Individuals 9.71% 
Total 100.00% 
Source: TVCA (2008) 
 
The result in the area of funding issues suggests that the changes in government 
policies have greatly adverse impacts on the fundraising activities of local VC funds in 
Taiwan. 
 
(2) Investment opportunities 
Table 9 shows that there is a significant difference in investment opportunities 
between General VC fund, Specialty VC fund and PE fund; Figure 23 indicates the 
means of the three groups. Though the means of the three groups are located within 
2.25 to 2.70, the rationale behind the foreign VC/PE firms entering Taiwan is worth 
noticing. 
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Table 9: Homogeneity of Variances and Levene’s test - Investment Opportunity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Mean Plots - Investment Opportunity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum of  
Squares df 
Mean 
Square Sig. 
Between Groups 0.590 2 0.295 0.014 
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In the area of investment opportunity, most Specialty VC funds and PE funds view 
factor 1 - fewer entrepreneurs in Taiwan due to mature high-tech industry and factor 6 
- sluggish economy (entrepreneurs are less willing to start businesses) as “very 
difficult” and “quite difficult”. This shows that high-tech industry and the 
entrepreneurial climate in Taiwan offer the potential investment opportunities for 
global institutions. The result is consistent with the study of Gompers and Lerner 
(1998). They indicated that VC spread from western to Asian countries when the 
investment opportunities in the developing countries were increasing.  
 
In addition, Kenney et al. (2002a,b,c) noted several important factors that make Asian 
VC markets particular. From the result, it can be seen that two of those factors are 
dominant in VC market of Taiwan and become the main attractiveness to foreign VC 
firms - the development of a technological industrial base and an encouraging 
entrepreneurship climate. However, over 25-year development of high-tech industry 
and the sluggish economy, Taiwan might lose the attractiveness to foreign VC funds. 
 
In this area, most General VC funds view factor 2 - regulations limiting the investment 
of VC/PE funds in Mainland China and factor 3 – competition from corporate-based 
VC firms (eliminating the investment opportunities) as “very difficult” and “quite 
difficult”. The result indicates the adverse impacts by government regulations again 
and the problems of excessive VC funds in Taiwan. 
 
In 1989, total VC investment in Taiwan were only NTD$36.1 billion. In late 1990, the 
total amount had increased to over NTD$109.5 billion, with 126 VC firms involved. 
Although the growth is encouraging for VC industry in Taiwan, it also implies that there 
will be an excess of funds in search of fewer viable projects. A trend in Taiwanese VC 
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market is that many high-tech companies will establish their own VC funds 
(corporate-based VC) after they successfully list on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The 
rapid increase in number of VC could be attributable to loose regulations on local VC 
industry. 
 
Due to the increasing competition, fewer VC has invested in start-up stage. This is 
inconsistent with the points from that Taiwanese venture capitalists prefer to focus on 
start-up and expansion stage enterprises.  
 
In section 6.1, it is clear that most local VC invest in expansion and mezzanine stages. 
Enterprises in mezzanine stage are going to harvest returns and ready for IPO. They 
intend to raise funds from reputable investors to restructure their managerial team, 
and use the funds to expand capacity and improve capital structure. VC funds would 
undertake the lowest risks by funding mezzanine stage enterprises, but they may reap 
lower profits from the investments. 
 
(3) Human capital 
Table 10 indicates that there is a significant difference in human capital between 
General VC fund, Specialty VC fund and PE fund; Figure 24 indicates the means of 
the three groups. Specialty VC funds have the lowest means of the three groups. 
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Table 10: Homogeneity of Variances and Levene’s test - Human Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Mean Plots - Human Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum of  
Squares df 
Mean 
Square Sig. 
Between Groups 0.855 2 0.427 0.004 
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In the area of human capital, General VC funds and Specialty VC funds have similar 
perspectives on factor 3 - it takes long time to train a qualified VC/PE executive and 
factor 5 - decreasing rewards and prestige of being a venture capitalist due to fierce 
competition (it will cause fewer talents to dedicate to VC industry). Most of the two 
types of funds view the two factors as “very difficult” and “quite difficult” while the 3 PE 
funds view the 6 factors as “neutral”. This reflects the facts that many local VC firms 
have similar expertise and the increasing competition has caused the decreasing 
rewards and prestige of being a venture capitalist in Taiwan. In contrast to local VC 
firms, foreign PE firms have well-established global networking so they can recruit 
experts from all over the world. 
 
As a matter of fact, the growth of VC industry in Taiwan has been slowing down and 
the profitability has declined since 2004. It is obvious that the industry is during the 
transition from early stage VC focusing on financing high-tech startup to later stage 
PE offering managerial/value-added services for enterprises. However, local VC’s 
capability of transferring to late stage PE will be an important concern because most 
of them lack of management expertise and international reputation; besides, it will 
takes long time to train a qualified VC/PE executive. Therefore, the government 
should think seriously about those issues and legislate for helping grow PE industry or 
PE experts in Taiwan. 
 
(4) Exit mechanism 
Table 11 indicates that there is no significant difference in exit mechanism between 
General VC fund, Specialty VC fund and PE fund; Figure 25 indicates the means of 
the three groups. It is clear that the means of the three groups are quite close, within 
2.12 to 2.30. 
 69 
Table 11: Homogeneity of Variances and Levene’s test - Exit Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Mean Plots - Exit Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum of  
Squares df 
Mean 
Square Sig. 
Between Groups 0.231 2 0.116 0.151 
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Although the result shows that different types of funds do not have different viewpoints 
of the issues about exit mechanism in Taiwan by statistically analysis, the VC-backed 
IPOs in Taiwan are still worth discussing. 
 
Table 12 shows the companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the 
Over-The-Counter Securities Exchange from 2002 to 2006. VC-backed IPOs 
decreased from 68 in 2002 to 27 in 2006. According to 2008 Annual Industry Survey 
of TVCA, the main cause to the decrease in IPOs is the relatively lower Price/Earning 
ratio in local financial market. 
 
Table 12: IPOs in Domestic Equity Market from 2002 to 2006 
Year 
IPOs 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total IPOs 203 128 126 70 44 
VC-backed IPOs 68 53 39 27 27 
Source: TVCA (2007) 
 
As mentioned in Literature Review, the essence of VC is to purchase shares of the 
venture and the success of a venture capitalist is based on realizing gains of the 
shares. VC provides capital to the enterprises which are considered riskier by 
traditional financing (Amit et al.1998) and it is costly for banks and entrepreneurs to 
reach an agreement due to asymmetric information problems (Jeng and Wells 2000; 
Wright and Robbie 1998). Those arguments are in consistent with the strategies of 
Taiwanese government to develop high-tech industry by growing VC cluster. Unlike 
banks that usually finance enterprises by the value of collateral or the track record, 
venture capitalists are more willing to embrace risks and capable of selecting the 
enterprises having high potential growth. Therefore, venture investing would be the 
most effective mechanism for the newly established firms, especially the high-tech 
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start-up, to obtain capital as well as managerial advices for future expansion. 
 
VC is one of the important driving forces to improve the ability of SME to obtain funds 
through IPOs in the US and European financial market; a similar trend has emerged in 
Taiwan from the establishment of VC industry in the 1980s. Semiconductor and 
electronic industries have the most VC-backed enterprises in the past 20 years. 
However, the willingness of venture capitalists to realize gains through IPOs has 
diminished due to the poor performance of local financial market in recent years. 
 
Difficulty of challenge in the 4 broad areas 
Table 13 and Figure 26 show that different types of funds have different viewpoints of 
the difficulty of challenge in the 4 broad areas by statistically analysis. 
 
Table 13: Homogeneity of Variances and Levene’s test - Difficulty of Challenge in the 
4 Broad Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 
 
 
Sum of  
Squares df 
Mean 
Square Sig. 
Between Groups 3.360 2 1.680 0.000 
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Figure 26: Mean Plots - Difficulty of Challenge in the 4 Broad Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27 gives clearer information that both “lack of variety of funding sources” and 
“lack of investment opportunities” are the most difficult challenges of the 4 broad 
areas to General VC funds while “lack of investment opportunities” is the only area 
viewed as the most difficult challenge by PE funds and Specialty VC funds. 
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Figure 27: Lack of Variety of Funding sources and Lack of Investment Opportunities 
 
 Lack of variety of funding sources 
 
 
 
 
Strategies 
 
 
 
 Lack of investment opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategies that VC/PE firms are likely to do 
Table 14 displays that there is a significant difference in strategies between General 
VC fund, Specialty VC fund and PE fund; Figure 28 presents the means of the three 
groups and proves that different types of funds will adopt different strategies by 
statistically analysis. 
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Table 14: Homogeneity of Variances and Levene’s test - Strategies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Strategies of Taiwan Venture Capital Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum of  
Squares df 
Mean 
Square Sig. 
Between Groups 0.679 2 0.339 0.009 
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In this research, strategies that most General VC funds are likely to adopt are “remain 
with the current focus”, “alliance with other VC/PE firms” and “investment in Mainland 
China”. The result reinforces the facts that VC growth of China will have great impacts 
on VC industry in Taiwan. As noted above, VC emerged to be the important growth 
engine in the transition of centralized planned economies in China in the 2000s; in fact, 
this made China an attractive investing location not only for Taiwanese VC firms but 
also for global VC or PE firms. However, VC or PE funds registered in Taiwan are 
subject to the regulations limiting investment in China. Besides, many local VC funds 
are small-sized funds and lack of international reputation; therefore, to ally with other 
VC/PE firms would be a feasible strategy to face the challenges. 
 
The strategies that Specialty VC funds are quite likely to adopt are “aim to syndicate 
with foreign VC/PE firms and “develop closer links with university scientists”. Of the 8 
Specialty VC funds, 4 funds focus on startup stage in the survey; therefore, the result 
can reflect and explain their preferred strategy to develop closer links with university 
scientists. 
 
Strategies that PE funds are quite likely to adopt are “transferring to late stage private 
equity“, “investment in Mainland China” and “seek to reinvest with entrepreneurs with 
whom you have invested before”. Foreign PE funds have well-established global 
networking and more advanced expertise than domestic VC funds; therefore, the 
result may imply that PE funds would focus on the market of China if investment 
opportunities in Taiwan are decreasing. 
 
From the result, it can be seen that different types of funds will adopt different 
strategies to overcome the challenges they are facing in VC market of Taiwan. 
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6.3. Limitations of the research 
(1) Sample Set 
In this survey, number of total questionnaire issued is 202 but the response rate is a 
bit disappointedly low (61/202 = 30%). Though 61 funds include foreign VC, local VC, 
foreign PE and local PE, they only account for a smaller portion of the total 
participants in this industry of Taiwan. Besides, the unbalance between the number of 
VC and PE participants in this research is also an important factor that affects the 
result. There are only 3 foreign PE funds and 1 local PE funds responding the 
questionnaire; that is, the result from them might not represent the actuality or the 
viewpoints of all later stage PE. 
 
(2) Pilot testing 
Questionnaire is issued to TVCA and 4 local VC funds for piloting test before the 
survey is formally conducted. Though the feedback is very useful to modify the 
questionnaire, it could also limit the scope of questions because all of them are local 
participants. 
 
(3) Variance 
Fund size of those participant VC or PE firms is not taken into consideration. Fund 
size of the 55 local VC ranges from NTD$ 5,300 million to less than NTD$ 300million. 
Strategies of the smaller VC funds might differ from those of larger funds; however, 
this is not shown or discussed in the research.  
 
As a matter of fact, the limitations in this survey could reflect the unbalance of VC 
industry in Taiwan. There is a wide gap between the number of early stage VC funds 
and later stage PE funds. 
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7. Conclusion and Recommendation 
7.1. Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of this paper, it can be seen that VC growth in Taiwan currently 
faces the challenges of funding sources and investment opportunities. VC industry 
has been strategically developed by the government and become one of the most 
successful models in the world; however, it is evident that VC growth is facing the 
most difficult challenges since its establishment in 1983.  
 
Taiwanese government developed high-tech industry through growing VC cluster and 
venture investing became the most effective mechanism for high-tech startup to grow, 
expand and list on public financial markets. However, over 25-year development, 
mature high-tech industry and diminishing entrepreneurial climate have provided 
fewer investment opportunities; more and more listed companies need great deal of 
capital and managerial expertise from global PE firms to privatize so they will not be 
subject to regulations limiting the investment in Mainland China. The growth of China 
will definitely generate capital and VC experts flowing from Taiwan if the main 
challenges facing local VC are not dealt with well or continue deteriorating the 
competitiveness of local VC firms. 
 
In contrast to the growth of early stage VC industry, the development of later stage PE 
has not been strategically supported by the Taiwanese government. Although the 
government recognizes the importance of local VC to transfer to PE, it has not tried to 
legislate for PE development or help train PE executives in Taiwan. Another 
significant concern is the capability of local VC transferring to late stage PE. Most 
local VC funds are small-sized, and lack of management expertise or international 
reputation; it would be very difficult for them to transit from current situation. 
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7.2. Recommendation 
After the analysis of VC industry in Taiwan, its current challenges and the strategies 
VC firms are like to adopt, there are several recommendations for the further research 
relevant to this area. 
 
Firstly, the further research could develop a larger sample size in order to have a more 
comprehensive understanding of the VC firms’ investment behaviour. With the 
changes in economic environment and the mature high-tech industry, local VC firms 
will no longer be the dominant players in the Taiwanese market. They have to face not 
only the growth of China which would absorb capital and talents from Taiwan but also 
the competition from international PE firms. From 2006, there have been more and 
more global PE firms entering Taiwan and engaging in buyouts or financing of local 
listed companies. Despite no subsidiaries or branches in Taiwan, the impacts they 
caused to Taiwan might be greater. Those global leading PE funds are not included in 
the sample set of this study; however, it will be more interesting if the further research 
could extend the range to those PE funds and classify them into different 
comprehensive groups. 
 
Secondly, the profile of the participant VC or PE firms could be more detailed and 
diversify in order to extend the depth of the analysis. This paper examines the type of 
VC/PE funds, major expertise, source of capital, preferred investment stage and field; 
however, based on different perceptions, the further researches could include more 
information such as large fund size/small fund size, independent VC/corporate-based 
VC, family-owned VC/diversify-shareholder VC and so on. To analyze from more 
diversify perspective would help researchers get better understanding of VC industry 
in Taiwan. 
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Appendix 1 - The Governing Regulations of the National Development 
Fund 
 The Statute for Upgrading Industries §21: 
(1)To participate in the investment on important enterprises, projects, merger, 
acquisition and/or demerger relating to industrial upgrading or improvement of 
industrial structure which are beyond the capability or financial ability of private 
investors; 
(2)To provide financial facilities to important enterprises, projects, merger, acquisition 
and/or demerger relating to industrial upgrading or improvement of industrial structure 
but with insufficient capital; 
(3)To provide loans in line with the government industrial policy for assisting the sound 
development of industries; 
(4)To set aside an appropriate percentage of the development fund in support of 
projects relating to providing necessary assistance to the development of medium 
and/or small enterprises; 
(5)To take cooperative actions in the furtherance of projects initiated by the competent 
authorities concerned for acquiring advanced technologies from abroad, promoting 
R&D, training personnel, pollution control, acceleration of improvement of industrial 
structure and/or betterment of economic development; 
(6)To provide loans, in line with the national policy of sustainable development, for 
assisting industries’ clean production, energy saving, reduction of greenhouse gas 
effects and other relevant projects. 
(7)Other purposes as specially approved by the Executive Yuan. 
(8)The financial source of the National Development Fund shall be the appropriations 
from National Treasury. In addition, the operating balance of the National 
Development Fund, if any, may be put into the fund after due budget approval 
procedures for continuous use.
Appendix 2 - The National Development Fund Investment in VC 
Enterprises 
The application process will take approximately 3 months; the flow chart of application 
for investment is shown as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 - Investment Amount and Numbers of Investments from 1998 to 2006】
 1998 to 2006 by Dollar Amount Invested 
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Appendix 4 - Venture Capital Management Firms 
As of Dec. 2006 
】  Fund Management Firm Fund (Individual Capital Under Management) Number 
of fund 
Total Fund 
Size(NT$100M) 
1 WK Associates WK Technology Fund,Fund IV,Fund V,Fund VI,Fund VII and Fund VII 6 109.91 
2 Top Taiwan Financial Cousulting Corp.Ltd. Top Taiwan V.C.Co.,Ltd.,II,III,IV,V,VI 6 68.8 
3 Fortune Consulting Group Inc. 
Golden Technology, Cosmos Technology,Legend 
Technology,Far Eastern Technology,taitan Technology,SF 
Technology,Central Technology,Communication 
Technology,Emerging Technology,Grand Cathay&Fortune 
Technology,FCGI Technology,NCTU Spring I Technology 
Venture Capital Investment Corp. 
12 63.55 
4 China Venture Management,Inc. 
R.O.C. Strategic,China Corporate,Sino-scan,Kingdom,China 
Alliance,R.O.C.,CDIB Strategic,Wa Tech Venture Fund,Ltd. 8 54.35 
5 The CID Group Ltd. China International ,China Century ,Globe Vision ,Quanta Venture, China Power 5 53.75 
6 Concord Financial Co.,Ltd. Concord II,Concord IIIV,Concord IV,Concord V,Concord VI,Concord VII and Concord VIII Venture Capital Corp. 7 53.7 
7 Koos Venture Capital Co.,Ltd Koos Venture Capital Co.,Ltd 1 53.56 
8 Hotung International Co.,Ltd. Hotung,Litung,Futung,Wantung,KC,Baotung,Chiatung,Sheng Tung,Chung-Shan II Venture Capital Corp. 8 53.55 
9 Fortune Venture Capital Corp. Fortune Venture Capital Corp. 1 50 
10 Pacific Venture Partners Pacific,TKS,H-Com,Century,Jupiter,Venus,MercuryVenture Capital Co.,Ltd. 7 48.6 
11 Pac-Link Management Corp. 
Tei Yuen,FuYu,Shin Sheng and Paclink Bio Venture Capital 
Investment Corp. 4 48.27 
12 IBT Management Corp. IBT Venture Co. and Boston Life Science Venture Corp. 2 40 
13 Hyield Management Consulting Corp. Hyield Venture Capital Co., Ltd. 1 40 
14 Cheng Xin Venture Capital Group 
First Bio,Bio World,Bio 21,Super Tech,Nobel Tech,Win Plus and 
Apex Venture Capital Corp. 7 39.4 
15 Harbinger Venture Management Co., Ltd 
Union,Harbinger II,Harbinger III,Harbinger V Venture Capital 
Corp. 5 36.5 
16 Sinostar Capital Inc., Fubon,Ta Ya,NCTU,Sinostar and Chiabon Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 5 32.5 
17 CTB FINANCIAL Management & CONSULTING Co., LTD Universal,CTB I Venture Capital Investment Corp. 3 32.04 
18 CDIB Knowledge-Based Economy Capital Co., Ltd CDIB Knowledge-Based Economy Capital Co., Ltd 1 30 
19 CIDC Consultants Inc. Grand Cathay,Grand Cathay II and Grand Cathay III Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 3 30 
20 Vincera Ventures Hua Jing,Cho Feng,Hua-Chin,Softchina,Softchina II,Han-Jung 
and Hua-Liu venture Capital II Corp. 6 29.82 
21 FAT Capital Management Fat Venture,Titan I and Titan II Capital Co.,Ltd. 3 29.61 
22 Performance Assets Management Corp. Sheng-Hua,Prosperity Venture Capital Corp. 2 28.2 
23 Premier Capital Management Corp. Premier,Chief,Sun-Yuan PK,PK II Venture Capital Corp. 5 28 
24 Cathay Pacific Partners Cathay Pacific, Cathay 按 Venture Capital Co., Ltd. 3 27 
25 H&Q Taiwan Co Ltd., hantech,H&H,H&A venture Capital Investment Corp. 3 25.47 
26 CDIB BioScience Venture Management Inc. Euroc Venture Capital Corp. 1 25 
27 Globaltec Management Consulting Corp. InveSatar Dayspring,Fuhwa I Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 4 24.95 
28 Champion Consulting Corp. Prudence Venture Investment Corp. 4 24.17 
29 Chung-Yung V.C Fund,Ltd. CDIB BioScience Venture I 1 23.38 
30 Euroc Venture Capital Corp., Technology ,Partner,Technology partner II,Technology Partmer III, Technology partner IV Venture Capital Corp 3 22 
31 InveStar Capital.,Inc Chien Kung,Chein Cheng,Chien Pang,Hon Pang Venture 2 22 
32 Prudence Capital Management Ltd. Globaltech management consulting Corp. 1 20 
33 Chinatrust Venture Capital Corp. Chinatrust Venture Capital Corp. 1 20 
34 
Global Strategic Investment 
Management Inc. Taiwan 
Branch 
Universal Development investment Company,Global Stractegic 
Venture Capital Corp. 2 20 
35 Yangtze Association Huiyang Private Equity Fund Co.,Ltd 1 19.5 
36 Maxima Capital Management, Inc. Maxima Ventures I ,Inc.,Taiwan 1 18.63 
37 Fubon Finaalcial Holding Venture Capital Corp. Fubon Finaalcial Holding Venture Capital Corp. 1 18 
38 Uni-Pac Management Company Pan-pacific,Pan-pancific II Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 2 16.4 
39 Technology Associates Development Corp. Technology Associates Corp.Tech Alliance Corp. 2 16.25 
40 iD Innovation Inc. Dragon Investment Fund I Co., Ltd. 1 16.2 
41 Sunsino Development Associate Inc. 
Hwa yi,Hwa Hsin,hwa Nan ,hwa Chung,Der Yang Biotech 
Venture Capital Co.,Ltd 5 15.81 
42 Sinopac Asset Management Int'l Corp. National Venture Capital Corp.,Communicator II Venture Capital 2 15.41 
43 Mentor Consulting Corp. Omnitek,Ascentek Venture Capital Corp. 2 15.4 
44 International Network Capital Management Corporation 
International Network Capital Corp.,International Network Capital 
Global Fund 2 15 
45 IVCIC Walden Management Company ,Ltd 
Internattional,Asian,International Venture Capital investment III 
Corp. 3 14.6 
46 TSC Venture Management, Inc. Technology Partmers V.V. Co.,Tsc,Cathy Venture Capital Corportaion 3 13.65 
47 Industrial Technology Investment Corporation Alpha Venture Capital Fund .,Vision Venture Capital Corp. 2 13.25 
48 PowerWorld Capital Management, Inc. Powerworld and Universal Venture Fund Inc. 2 12.8 
50 Centillion Venture Capital Corp. Centillion Venture Capital Corp. 1 12 
51 YFY global biofund Taiwan Global Biofund 1 11.25 
52 SAGA Unitek Ventures LandPort I,Land Mark, Yua-Jung,Ascendax Venture Capital Corp. 4 10.36 
53 Taishin Management&Consulting Taishin Venture Capital Incestment Co.,Ltd. 1 10 
54 E.Sun Venture Capital Co.,ltd. E.Sun Venture Capital Co.,ltd. 1 10 
55 Paralink Venture Group Parawin Venture Capital Corp. 1 10 
56 Fuhwa Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. Fuhwa Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 1 10 
57 Sunplus Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. Sunplus Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 1 10 
58 Hua Nan Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. Hua Nan Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 1 10 
59 TaiAn Technologies Eminent VC 1 10 
60 Pac-Link Management Corp. Paclink Bio Venture Capital Investment Corp. 1 10 
61 First Taiwn Financial Service Inc., First Taiwan and FR Venture Capital Inc. 2 9.7 
62 United Capital Management United Venture Capital Corp. 1 8.9 
63 Aster Venture Corp. Aster,Crystal Technology Venture Capital investment Corp. 2 7.3 
64 Enrich Venture Capital Management Co., Ltd. 
Young-Shin,AAEON Technology Venture Capital incestment 
Corp. 2 7.05 
65 Taiwan United Venture Management Corporation Taiwan United Venture Capital Corporation 1 7 
66 Hung-Wei Venture Capital Corp. Hung-Wei Venture Capital Corp. 1 7 
67 First Financial Management Consulting Co., Ltd. First Venture Capital Co.,Ltd. 1 7 
68 All Asia Partners Cheng-Yang V.C.Corp. 1 6 
69 Global Venture Capital Corp. Global Venture Capital Corp. 1 6 
70 Capital Venture Management Corp. Capital Venture】 fund II Co.,Ltd 1 6 
71 Jih Sun Capital Management Co., Ltd. Jih Sun Venture Capital Investment Co. 1 6 
72 AAA Capital Management Co., Ltd. Cathay Venture Capital Corporation 1 6 
73 Communicator Venture Management Inc. Giga-Trend International Venture Investment Corp. 1 5.6 
74 Primus Management Inc Enrichment Venture Capital Corp 1 5.3 
75 WIT investment Partners,ltd. Primus Technology Fund 1 5.3 
76 Joint Choice Venture Capital Corp. Joint Choice venture Capital Corp.,Joint-Fun V.C. Corp. 2 5.21 
77 ID Techventure Co. ID Fund Two Co. 1 5.04 
78 Centillion 暗 Venture Capital Corp. Centillion Venture Capital Corp. 1 5.02 
79 Grand Pacific V.C. Co.,Ltd. Grand Pacific V.C. Co., Ltd 1 5 
80 University Ventures, Inc. University Ventrues, Inc. 1 5 
81 UTEK Venture Capital Corporation UTEK Venture Capital Corporation 1 5 
82 Waterland Venture Capital Co. Ltd. Waterland Venture Capital Co. Ltd 1 5 
83 Chien Yeh Venture Capital Chien Yeh Venture Capital 1 4.57 
84 InnoVision Venture Capital Corp. InnoVision Venture Capital Corp. 1 4.5 
85 Core Pacific Consulting Co. Core Pacific Venture Capital Corp. 1 4.03 
86 Catalyst Venture Capital Firm Alliance 按 ,Alliance暗 and Alliance 案 Venture Capital Co., Ltd. 3 4 
87 C.F.L Venture capital Co.,Ltd C.F.L Venture capital Co.,Ltd 1 4 
88 Vista Incubation Technology Corporation Vista Technology Venture Capital Investment Corporation 1 4 
89 D-link Venture Capital investment Corp. D-link Venture Capital investment Corp. 1 3.5 
90 China Technology Venture Managementl Corp. China Technology Venture Capital Corp. 1 3.5 
91 Aspire Venture Fund Aspire Venture Fund 1 3 
92 PARADIGM Paradigm Venture 1 2.86 
93 Luxon Venture Capital Corp. Luxon Venture Capital Corp. 1 2.43 
94 Interpacific V. Group Inc. Interpacific V. Group Inc. 1 2.09 
95 Darly Venture Inc. Darly 3 Venture Inc. 1 2.05 
96 Triton Management Corp. Triton I venture Capital Ltd. 1 2.02 
97 Kuotung V.C. Corp. Kuotung V.C. Corp. 1 2 
98 Taiwan Venture Capital Corp. Taiwan Venture Capital Corp. 1 2 
99 KC venture Capital KC venture Capital 1 2 
100 Agora Investment Management Ltd Comtel Technology Venture Fund 1 2 
101 Info Venture Capital Corp. Info Venture Capital Corp. 1 2 
102 Kuo-Chun Financial Management Inc. Kuo-Ding Venture Investment Co., Ltd. 1 1.85 
103 Tailink Venture Partners Tailink Venture Fund 按 1 1.83 
104 Chien Hsing Venture Capital Corp. Chien Hsing Venture Capital Corp. 1 1.71 
105 Kang Chun Venture Capital Kang Chun Venture Capital 1 1.67 
105 Fund management firms Total Capital 1,853.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 - Top 20 Private Equity Trade Sale Exits in 2007 Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Asian Venture Capital Journal (2009)
Appendix 6 - Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire Survey 
1. The research is conducted by Huang, Chih-Ying who is currently an MBA 
student at University of Nottingham in the UK. 
2. The purpose of this research is to investigate the challenges facing VC/PE 
industry in Taiwan and the strategies VC/PE firms are likely to adopt. 
3. The questionnaire is for the purpose of research, so all the information you 
provide in the questionnaire will not be disclosed. 
4. I sincerely hope that you can participate in the questionnaire survey and 
offer valuable information for this research. 
5. Please use the following contact information should you have any 
questions about the questionnaire. 
 
Contact information: 
Name: Huang, Chih-Ying 
Email: lixcyh@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participant! 
Part I: Profile of participant VC/PE firms 
 
Q1. Type of your companyゑ 
ばGeneral Purpose Fund(VC fund)  ばSpecialty Fund(VC fund)  ばPE fund 
 
Q2. Major expertise of your companyゑ 
ばFinancial expertise  ばFund-raising  ばWell-networking in Industry 
ばIndustry/Technology know-how  ばManagement skills/Value-added 
 
Q3. Major source of funds of your companyゑ 
ばHigh-net-worth individuals  ばParent company  ばGovernment 
ばPension Funds  ばInsurance Companies  ばBanks   
ばInvestment Companies  ばFinancial Holding Companies 
ばCorporate Investors 
 
Q4. Major investment field of your companyゑ 
ばIT   ばTelecommunication   ばSoftware/Internet  ばSemiconductor    
ばIC design  ばBiotech   ばElectronic  ばChemical 
ばPrecision Machinery and Automation    ばOptoelectronic    
ばMaterial   ばAerospace  ばEnvironmental Engineering  
ばMedical/Pharmaceutics/Health care 
ばBanking  ばMedia  ばTraditional Manufacturing  ばVenture Capital 
 
Q5. Your company focuses onゑ 
ばSeed Stage  ばStartup Stage  ばExpansion Stage  ばMezzanine Stage 
ばRestructuring/Turnaround Stage  ばBuyoutOM&A   
ばDistressed Asset/Non-performing loans 
 
 
 
Part II: Challenges to Taiwan VC/PE industry 
What do you see as the main challenges facing the venture capital industry in Taiwan? 
Please circle 1れ2れ3れ4れ5 on each factor according to the degree of difficulty of the 
challenge.  
1- very difficultれ2- quite difficultれ3- neutralれ4- quite favorableれ5- very favorable 
 
Q1. What do you see as the main challenges with respect to funding issues?  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Regulations limiting the participation of postal deposits and 
government pension funds in investment in VC/PE funds 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Cancellation of tax credit incentive enjoyed by shareholders of 
VC funds 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Competition from local corporate VC firms in fund-raising ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Lack of international reputation/Difficulties in fund-raising from 
international institutions 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Lack of economic prosperity/poor performance of VC/PE firms ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
The economic growth of Mainland China generates capital 
flowing from Taiwan 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
@
Q2. What do you see as the main challenges with respect to investment opportunities?  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Fewer entrepreneurs in Taiwan due to mature high-tech 
industry@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Regulations limiting the investment of VC/PE funds in Mainland 
China ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
More corporate-based VC firms, which eliminates the 
investment opportunities ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Lack of links to potential entrepreneurs ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Few entrepreneurs with international experience and 
technology know-how returning to Taiwan ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Sluggish economy/ entrepreneurs are less willing to start 
businesses  ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Q3. What do you see as the main challenges with respect to human capital?  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of official VC/PE experts training institutes in Taiwan@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Decrease in students studying abroad, which results in fewer 
VC with international experiences and vision 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
It takes long time to train a qualified VC/PE executive ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Taiwanese VC/PE experts flow to Mainland China ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Decreasing rewards and prestige of being a venture capitalist 
due to fierce competition, fewer talents dedicate to VC Industry 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Alluring pay from high-tech companies which absorb talents 
from VC/PE industry 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
@
Q4. What do you see as the main challenges with respect to exit mechanisms?  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of economic prosperity ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Ability to float Taiwanese businesses on NASDAQ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Lack of strategic sale opportunities ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Unwillingness of later stage VC/PE to purchase investments 
from early stage VCs 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Difficulties in managing the exit process due to challenges in 
advising entrepreneurs 
ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Relatively lower Price/Earning ratio in financial market ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
 
 
 
Q5. Overall, how would you rate the difficulty of challenge in each broad area? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of variety of funding sources ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Lack of investment opportunities ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Decrease in human capital ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Exit mechanism ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
 
 
Part III: Strategies of Taiwan venture capital industry 
 
In order to face the current difficulties, what kinds of strategies is your company likely 
to adopt in the following 3 years? 
1- very likelyれ2- quite likelyれ3- likelyれ4- unlikelyれ5- very unlikely 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Remain with the current focus ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Transferring to late stage private equity ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Alliance with other VC/PE firms ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Investment in Mainland China ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Recruit more local executives ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Aim to syndicate with foreign VC/PE firms ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Develop closer links with intermediates ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Develop closer links with university scientists ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
Seek to reinvest with entrepreneurs with whom you have 
invested before [serial entrepreneurs] ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@ ば@
 
